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CHAPTER I 
HOW THE WEB WILL BE UNRAVELED 
British imperialisml Some men have spoken these words with 
pride; others have spat them out with scornful contempt. They 
have been uttered respectfully by millions for whom these words 
embodied an ideal for which they were willing to sacrifice their 
very lives. They have been muttered with deepest hatred by 
other millions for whom the phrase has meant defeat, exploitation i 
and slavery. The proper intonation for these two words is what 
is sought in these pages. A sound, objective judgment of Bri-
tish imperialism will be the ultimate goal of this study. 
The British empire has been judged time and time again. 
Some scholars have roundly condemned it; others have written with 
enthusiastic praise of its growth and merits. A sizeable library 
could be filled with books written on this subject. Yet the 
great majority of the comments made on the morality of this sub-
ject leave the reader still in doubt as to the extent to which 
he should condemn or praise the British for their imperialistic 
activities. 
From among those who have sat in judgment on the merits of 
the British Empire, Lord Rosebery would be a good choice for 
spokesman in its defense •. Prime minister of England, 1894-1895, 
1 
. 
and an enthusiastic promoter of the extension of the empire, he 
could speak eloquently in favor of British imperialism, as the 
following quotation shows: 
How marvelous it all is! Built not by saints and 
angels, but with the work of men's hands; cemented 
with men's honest blood and with a world of tears, 
welded by the best brains of centuries past; not 
without the taint and reproach incidental to all 
human work, but constructed on the whole with pure 
and splendid purpose. Human, and yet not wholly human, 
for the most heedless and the most c~~lcal must see 
the finger of the Divine. l 
Lord Rosebery admitted that not all men cherished the senti-
ments he felt toward imperialism~ He conceded that "there are 
some to whom the very word is abhorrent; to whom, at any rate, 
the word Is under sU8picion. n2 If Rosebery had read any of the 
comments of historian Parker Thomas Moon on the subject of imper-
ialISM, he would have seen that Mr. Moon was one of the many for 
Whom the word had a less pleasant sound. For Moon imperIalism 
has about it the mercenary ring of clinking coins. He finds it 
nothing other than a more dignIfied name for prof.lte$ring 
meroantilism.) 
LookIng further throurp the var10us v1ews on imperialism 
which men have held, we t1nd a group of scholars which in large 
ILord Rosebery, Miscellanies: Literary ~ Historical 
(London, 1921), II, 262-263. 
2Ib1d., 232. 
-
lParker Thomas Moon, Imperialism ~ World Politics, (New 
York, 1927), 12. I 
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measure removes the imperialistic activities of the British trom 
the moral realm. To these men the British empire appears to have 
grown up in spite of the English rather than beoause they desired 
it. It was the oontention, for example, of Sir John Seeley, 
nineteenth oentury political historian, that the British appar-
ently "conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence 
of mind. ,,4 
These and most other evaluations of British imperialism 
contain some truth. However, the picture they present is often 
prejudiced and always either essentially incomplete or too 
generalized to be very helpful. Historians have not been inter-
ested enough in the morality of imperialism to spend the time 
and effort necessary to determine what it is. Yet this is the 
aspect of imperialism most discussed by the man on the street or 
the student in the leoture chair. 
It is true enough, a8 Moon as written, that "it is a tangled 
web that imperialism weaves."' To date, scholars have not 
fathomed very clearly the way in which the web was woven. Many, 
pulling here and there at the design, have oome to somewhat hasty 
conclusions about the motives behind imperialism. In general, 
the bits of truth arrived at have been stretched to answer 
questions and to explain actions they oannot adequately answer 
4Willlam L. Langer, ~ Diplomacz 21 Imperialism: 1890-1902, (New York, 19$1). 69. 
SMoon, Imperialism ~ World Politlca, 236. 
4 
or explain. 
Most writings on the subjeot remind one of the jingle about 
the six blind scholars of Indostan who tried to describe an ele-
phant: 
It was six men of Indostan 
To learning much inclined 
Wao went to see the Elephant 
(Though all of thom were blind), 
That each by observation 
Might satiai'Y his mind. 6 
As the verse goes on to tell us, each man took hold of the 
elephant at a different place, and ea~~ conoluded from this 
limited experience as to the sort of animal the elephant was. 
One felt ita side; he decided that "the elephant is very like a 
wall." Another grasped its tusk, thereby concluding that it was 
"very like a spear." A third took hold of its trunk; he stated 
that the elephant wav similar to a snake. A fourth thought it 
"very like a tree" because he had clasped it by the knee. 
Another ran his hands over the animal's ear and thought it like 
a fan. The sixth blind man, grabbing its tail, concluded that 
the strange animal was "very like a rope." 
And so the men of Indostan 
Disputed loud and long 
Each in his own opinion 
Exceeding stIff and strong, 
Though eaoh was partly right 
And all were in the wrongl 1 
6Thomaa P. Neill, Makers of the Modern Mind (Milwaukee, 
1949), 2. - - -
1Ibid. 
In very similar tasion scholars have studied one or other 
aspect of British imperialism and then either given their con-
elusions as the whole picture, or, at best, given conclusions 
which are dissatisfying because of their incompleteness. 
5 
This "Indostan" approach to the morality ot imperialism has 
also resulted In a wide divergence ot opinion. Many have taken 
a fact or two, wrapped these in surmises, bound in their partic-
ular philosophies of life, and put out the whole as a judgment 
on BritIsh imperialism. In the following citation professor 
William L. Langer of Harvard University enumerates some of the 
difterent analyses of the motivation behind imperialism: 
The liberal-bourgeois writers ••• are apt to stress 
considerations of prestige, the desire for security, 
the striving towards national self-sufficiency, the 
tendency towards the organization of ever larger social 
unita, or the urge of deeply-rooted ethical senti-
ments as the impelling motive. underlying the desire 
tor expansion. Profe~eor Sohumpeter has advanoed the 
ingenious and persuasive argument that imperialism 
is really nothing but ataVism, a belated outoropping 
of a primitive disposition towards aggression ••• 
Another recent stUdent of the problem enda by rejecting 
all previous explanations and reduces imperialism to 
an expression of the honor motif which i. so potene 
a force in the sooial groups as in the individual. 
Suffice it to say, then, as professor Langer concludes, 
that there as been little agreement among those who have analyzed 
imperialism as to the motives which induce a co~~try to expand 
its territory or oontrol. 
8Langer, Diplomacy £! Imperialism, 68. 
r 
6 
The only way til :sound judgment of British imperialism can be 
made is by a thorough, unprejudiced examination of historical 
facts. Just what the British did and why they did it must be 
I 
determined. The mtiltiplicity of differing conclusions as to 
what motivated Bri11ish imperialist expansion can be explained by 
I 
the faot thatthis;-.pproaoh has not often been used. As profes-
" , 
, 
sor Langer writes, referring to nineteenth century imperialism, 
"almost no attempt, has been made to analyze a concrete example 
of imperialist actaon 1n the period."9 Such an analYSis is what 
this work attempta.. This method is the basis for hope that this 
study will suecee4. in giving a rather adequate explanation of 
the motivation beiind British imperialism. 10 
I 
The method w~ll be to study a concrete example of British 
imperialism. The: investigation w11l advance through four stages. 
First, a discovert of what the British actually did. Secondly, 
I: 
determining who ••• responsible for the actions taken. ~nirdly. 
an investigation ~f why the British nation acted the way it did 
in this particula~ instance. Fourthly, til judgment of just how 
praiseworthy were, the polIcies adopted. 
, 
9~., 69 •. 
l0Much of w~~t is said in these pages will not apply per-
fectly to the ear~y history of England's imperialiSM 8~nce the 
period here stud ~d is the later nineteenth century. '!.he form 
of government and political philosophy of ~ngland during the last 
century differed: ·in significant aspects from that of England in 
the sixteenth, s~venteenth, or even eighteenth centuries. 
, ' 
- - -- ---~----
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7 
It would oertainly be more satisfying to make an exhaustive 
analysis of several examples of British imperialist aotivity, 
but since this would be impossible in a work of modest size, the 
next best approach seems to be to examine thoroughly one instance 
of the growth of the British empire. This method is more advis-
able than a summary investigation of a number of cases of imper-
ialism because thorough oomprehension of what actually happened 
is necessary before any solidly founded conolusions can be drawn. 
The British imperialistic activities studied in these pages 
center around the country of the Sudan, and cover the years 
1883-1899. During this period, one in which modern imperialism 
reached its peak, the African country known as the Sudan played 
an important role in British politics. Hardly a day went by 
during many of these years in which London papers did not carry 
an article about this land. This prominenoe which the Sudan 
enjoyed in the English mind makes it a proper choice as a test 
case for a study of the motivation behind British imperialism. 
Another reason for selecting the Sudan is that it was made part 
of the British empire during the years in which England added to 
her rule about three million square miles of African land, great 
stretches of border lands along the northern frontiers of India, 
balf the Malay peninsula, and several important islands in the 
South Pacifio. An understanding of the motives behind the taking 
of the Sudan will serve as a guide to understanding the reasons 
behind the other British aoquisitions during thissame period. 
8 
Moreover, the fact that British poliey regarding the Sudan 
changed frequently during the eighties and nineties affords an 
unusual opportunity to study the workings of the English imperial 
mind. For these reasons, then, the Sudan has been ohosen as the 
territory in which the driving forces behind British imperialism 
are to be investigated. 
First, the historical facts of the case will be related. 
What the English did in the Sudan is the question which will be 
answered. Onoe this has been ascertained, it will be neoessary 
to determine what individuals or groups were responsible for the 
actions taken. It would be impossible to determine correctly why 
50mething was done unless we first know who did it. Here the 
major problem will be to weigh the importance of the parts played 
by certain individuals, by the British parliament as a group, and 
by publio opinion in determining British imperial activities. 
HaVing shown who was responsible for the imperialist steps 
taken, it will then be possible to prooeed to a discovery and 
scrutiny of the reasons behind the1r actions. Here they study 
1s limited to two motives which the documents and facts show 
were the fundamental motives behind British action 1n the Sudan. 
The two motives are the influence of eoonomic cons idera tions and 
the urgings of national pride. 
Once it has been shown why the British acted the way they 
did during the various phases of their fluotuating interest in 
the Sudan. 1t will be possible to make a moral evaluation of 
9 
theae aotivities. Although a judgment of subjective guilt or 
lack of it in the individuals involved would be practieally im-
possible and will not be attempted, some decision as to the 
obJeotive merits of British imperialism in the Sudan will be made. 
Also the knowledge of the difficulties involved in making a 
categorical judgment of the ethic. ot imperialism should result 
trom this study. 
We are now ready to enter the first phase of our investiga-
tion. In this chapter we have outlined the purpose of this thesia 
and the method by which that purpose is to be achieved. Chapter 
II will outline the history of British aot1vity in the Sudan 
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
\ 
CHAPTER II 
BRITISH EXITS AND ENTRANCES IN THE SUDAN 
Bildad-es-Sudan, the Country of the Blacks, begins just 
south of Egypt and extends southwards for about 1200 milss to the 
boundaries of Kenya, Uganda, and the Belgian Congo. Stretching 
!'rom 700 to 1000 miles across I'rom east to weat, and lodged 
between the Red Sea and Ethiopia on the east and French Equator-
ial Africa on the west, the Sudan covers an area of 969,600 
square miles. l This is twenty .... six times the area of Indiana and 
about one-third the size of the United States. 
Lying wholly within the tropics, where according to an Arab 
saying "the soil is like fire and the wind like a flame fl2 this 
land, even today, is unsuited for habitation by white men. It 1s 
a land of jungles and plains in the south and deserts in the 
north. Great stretches of land along and to the east of the Nile 
have now been developed for growing cotton and sugar cane. In 
the nineteenth century it was a savage wilderness almost untouche 
IThe ESfPtian Question, 1882-1~21: Sixty ~ Years .~ Bri-
tish Occupat on of Egypt and the Su an (WashIngton, b. e,. l~), 
12. ---
2Moon, Imperialism ~ World Politics, 142. 
10 
ip
11 
by axe or plow. Its only important export was the Negro popula-
tion which the Arabs rounded up in large numbers and sold as 
slaves. 
The Sudan is populated by two peoples, Arabs and Negroes. 
Scholars can only surmise the number ot inhabitants there in the 
1880'.. Today approximately 6,250,000 Moslem Arabs roam the 
desert regiOns of the north, 2,500,000 pagan Negroes dwell in 
the veld and jungles of the south.) Neither of these two group. 
can boast a very high level ot civilization. The Arabs are some-
what more advanced than the various Negro trIbes, but even the 
Arabs are, in large part, an Indolent people, satisfied to live 
without houses and with only the minimum of clothing. Their 
wants are rew, and they prefer the tree life of the desert and 
the plains to the trappings ot modern civilization.4 Most of the 
legro Sudanese are content to live outside of civilization. They 
see little or no reason for wearing clothes: they worship bulls, 
crocodiles, and puff adders, they consult witch doctors and rain-
makers; they buy their wive •• > 
Geographically the most important and best known feature ot 
the Sudan has always been the 11le River which begins in the 
..... 
3"The ~ettlement in the Sudan Eases the Middle East Crisi8," 
Newsweek (February 23, 1953), 34. 
4Prank Richardson Cana, "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan," Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 14th ed. (New York, 1929), XXI, 506. 
5"Settlement in the Sudan," lewsweek, 36; "Democracy tor 
Dinkas," l!!! (December 7, 1952), 35. 
12 
mountains near Lake Victoria to the south of the Sudan and works 
its way down the length of this country on its way to Egypt and 
the Mediterranean. ~he river brings water and tillable soil to 
the deserts of southern Sudan and to Egypt. It provided the only 
transportation other than the camel tor these two countries in 
the nineteenth century, and in large sector. of the Sudan this is 
true even at the present time. Winston Churchill's description 
of Egypt as "aut Hilus aut u1hil"6 aptly expresses the importance 
of this waterway to both Egypt and the Sudan. 
Such was the country conquered 1n 1821 by Mohammed Ali, the 
Khedive or governor of Egypt, then a province of the Ottoman 
Empire. This conquest marked the first political union of Egypt 
with the Sudan since almost ancient times. From then until 1881, 
when the Sudan revolted against the oppressive Egyptian rule, it 
was a breeding ground from which Egyptian slave traders freely 
picked their human merchandIse and the Egyptian government enlIst-
ed armies ot strong, brave soldIers. 
In 1881, A Sudane.e Arab named Mohammed Ahmed proclaImed 
himself the saviour of his country, dubbIng himself the Mahdi or 
spiritual leader of his people. With the help of his fellow 
countryman, Abdullah, who became his mIlitary advisor and politi-
cal strong man, the Mahdi successfully revolted against the badly 
organIZed, impoverished Egyptian government. By the next year, 
6winston L. S. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the 
Reconguest 2! ~ Sudan (New York, 19.33), T. - - -
13 
when Britain entered the picture, the Mahdi oontrolled the south-
ern half of the Sudan and was threatening to overrun the entire 
country. 
England's introduct1on to the Sudan oame in 1882 when she 
took over the rule of Egypt. At that time many British govern-
ment officials would have had difficulty finding the Sudan on a 
map, but because of its interests in Egypt the British empire was 
soon confronted with a serios of problems involving neighboring 
Sudan as thorny as the wild hashab tree from which the Sudanese 
tap gum arabic. 
The boom of guns trom English warships in the harbor of 
Alexandria marked the advent of British rule in Egypt. 1'he date 
was July 11, 1882. The chain of events which lead anti-imperi-
alist prime minister Gladstone to take this drastic step began in 
181S when the less conservative minded Disraell b.ought 116,000 
shares of stock in the Suez canal. These shares, bought from 
bankrupt Egypt, amounted to nine-twentieths of all the stock in 
the company.1 From this moment England was forced to become 
interested in Egypt. By paying 4,000,000 pounds sterling for a 
passageway through this country to the Red Sea, Britain was dedi-
oated to the policy of protecting her investment. 
In 1876 the financial difficulties of the Egyptian govern-
ment led to the establishment of joint Anglo-French control over 
1 John E. Bowen, The Conflict 2! !!!! !ES!rvest .!B. ESypt, 
(New York, 1887), 31.---
Egypt. This foreign domination of their country chafed Egyptian 
nationalists, and in 1881 a native Egyptian colonel, Arabi Pasha, 
became the leader of a hybrid nationalist-military movement that 
caused many disturbances in the country. The EnglIsh government, 
now headed by "Little Englander" Gladstone, wishing to stay out 
ot Egypt, wanted to invite the Turks to restore order in the 
country, but this was vetoed by Preycinet, French prime minister. 
A joint Anglo-French fleet was sent to Alexandria. While Britain 
and F'rance wrangled over what to do with it, the Egyptian govern-
ment fell into the hands of Arabi Pasha, who Britain refused to 
recognize; riots broke out in Alexandria in June, 1882; the Prenob 
ships withdrew. When shore batteries, which presumably threat-
ened the British navy anchored in the harbor of Alexandria, were 
strengthened despite British portest, the British bombarded the 
forts on July 11, 1882. This act occasioned fresh riots, the 
burning ot:' the c1 ty, and the land!ng ot Brit1sh forces to restore 
order. A ~rit1sh expeditionary torce commanded by Lord Wolseley 
deteated Arabi Pasha in the battle ot Tel-el-Kebir, September 
1), 1862; Cairo was occupied. 
The British government, itselt a misxture of imperialists 
and anti-imperialists, sanctioned a government in Egypt similarly 
divided against itself. 'The Khedive or governor ot Egypt remainea 
officially the ruler or the country. He was allowed to govern 
1n all matters 1n which the British had no interest. To repre-
sent the British a consul-general to Calro was appointed by 
1$ 
England. Sir Evelyn Baring, later elevated to the peerage as 
Earl of Cromer, held this position from 1883 to 1907. Theoreti-
cally Cromerts position was that of advisor to the Egyptian 
government. De .;;;.f.-a ... c ... to ... he held supreme authority in the country 
because the British government soon made it clear that his advice 
was always to be followed. A confidential message from Lord 
Oranv111e, British foreign secretary, to Cromer, January 4, 1884, 
reveals the grip of steel control modestly gloved by the term 
"advisor". Lord Granville wrote: 
It 1s essential that in important questions affecting 
the administration and safety of Egypt, the advice of 
Ber Majesty's Government should be followed, as long 
as the provisional occupation continues. Ministers 
and Governors must carry out th1s advice or forfeit 
their offices. The appointment of English Mlnlsters 
would be most objeotionable, but 1t wIll no doubt be 
possible to find Egyptians who will execute the ~le­
dive'. orders under En§11Sh advice. The Cabinet will 
give you full support. 
Britain was gradually rorcad to abandon the pretense of her 
ad v 1aory pos 1 tion by develop::uents in the Sudan. The pitiful 
Zgyptian army continued, even after British occupation of their 
country, to fight the Mahdists. On September 8, 1883, a new 
offensive was begun. The army Egypt sent to battle was in deplQr 
able oondition. Colonel Stewart, an English professional soldier 
hired to train the Egyptians for battle, oomplained that his 
offioers were inoapable of "grasping the meaning of the simplest 
8Lord Oromer. Modern EgzPt (New York, 1908), I. 382. 
fa
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movement."9 He estimated that one-third of the troops could not 
fire a rifle, and that they would be more effective armed with 
sticks than with guns. With such resources Egypt attempted to 
repulse the ferocious Sudanese who Tlere fired w:!. th the vis ion of 
freedom from Egyptiar.l oppression. The Egyptians were defeated 
in every battle, until finally on November 18, 1883, General 
Hicka, English professional soldier and commander-in-chier of the 
Egyptian army, was killed anc. his army annihlla. ted.. After this 
battle southern and north western Sudan was controlled by the 
Sudanese who were threatening to invade Egypt itself. 
Prime Minister Gladstone tried to 1.gnore the war. Having 
allowed England to enter. E'gTpt only under protest, he refused to 
become fUrt.b.er involved by add:l.ng the Sudhn to his worries • 
.flirst of' all, he symp.l.thiaed with the Sudanese who he said were 
1Ia. nation rightly struggling to be free."lO Moreover, his only 
i.ntereet in Egypt; was to save it financially so that other Buro-
pean powers could·not il1terfore in ~ts government on the score 
of settling what was owed them and thus endangering English con-
trol of the Suez. l1 
Hiding behind the fiction that Egypt was an independent 
nation, even though British troops occupied Cairo and Egyptian 
lOJohn Morley, ~~e Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 2nd ad. (New York, 1932), II~--
11Pau1 Knaplund, Gladstonets .t-'orelgn PollOI (New York, 1935), 
1 
• 
17 
ortlolals held their jobs only so long as they carried out Bri-
tain's oommands, the English government refused to deal with the 
crisis in the Sudan. On May 1, 188), Lord Granville stated that 
"Her Maj esty's Government are in no way responsible for the oper-
ations in the Sudan, which have been undertaken under ~~e author-
ity of the Egyptian government.,,12 Cromer continued to get 
"hands ott" orders trom London until the situation could not 
possibly be ignored any longer. As late as November, 1883, a 
telegram trom Granville read, "Her Majesty's Government oan do 
nothing which would throw upon them the responsibility ot opera-
tions in the Sudan. The Egyptian Government must rely upon their 
own resources."13 However, after November 18 when EngliShman 
Hioks and his entire army were massacred, Britain could no longer 
remain neutral. Still with no desire to use English soldiers or 
money to subdue the Sudanese, the foreign seoretary instruoted 
the British consul in Egypt to advise abandoning the Sudan.14 
Suoh advise was not weloomed by the Egyptian governor, but since 
the advise was repeated with some insistenoe, the governor had 
no other choioe than to resign. Orders were given to Egyptian 
garrIsons and citizens as well as any foreigners residing In the 
Sudan to evacuate. 
12A. B. Theobald, !h! Mahdiya: ! History 2! ~ Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899 (London, 1951),53. 
l)Ibld., 10. 
-14~., 69. 
18 
Scattered throughout the Sudan were roughly $0,000 Egyptian 
soldiers and 5000 civilians who faced possible death or enslave-
ment unless saved from the armies of the Mahdi. l5 Thia presented 
a grave problem. The people to be evacuated were living in small 
groups isolated from one another. Flight would be impeded by the 
provisions and possessions they must carry, as well as by the 
presence of large numbers of women and children among the refu-
gees. There were no railways or modern roads. Water was very 
scarce, the country they must travel was desert land. Even 10 
peaoe time the problem would have been one of immense difficulty. 
But it was not peace time. Bostile and victorious armies- barred 
the way, and elosely invested the garrison towns. The whole 
country was in rebellion, and the fanatical warriors of the Mahdi 
wished nothing better than to oatoh their enemies in the open. 
The British government refused to use English troops to aid 
evaouation. Reither would it allow the still poorly organized 
Egyptian army to do this work. 16 Gladstone approved a request 
to the Ottoman empire for aid, but In the end this government too 
refused to send troops. Disinterested In the Sudan, the British 
prime minister, when giving permission to use Turkish troops, 
told his foreign secretary, -I oare more that we keep out of the 
Sudan than who g088 10."17 
l$Cromer, Modern EgYpt, II, 31. 
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But insistent pleas for help from the Egyptians, the fear of 
losing control of Parliament, and the rumblings of British public 
sympathy for the people stranded in the Sudan forced Gladstone 
to take eome action. On December 1, 1883, he decided on the 
expedient of sending an Englishman to investigate the situation 
and possibly to organize the evaouation. ~le man he chose was 
General Charles "Chinese" Gordon. 
r<.';f. Gordon had governed the Sudan for the Egyptians from 1814 
to 1819. He was also a popular hero in England because of his 
exploits in suppressing the Taiping rebellion in China, 1862-
1864. However, when the Egyptian government and Lord Cromer were 
asked about sending Gordon, both thought it inadvisable. Cromer 
thougnt Gordon too unprediotable for the job. 18 The Egyptian 
government, as Lord Cromer wrote to Granville on Deoember 2, 1883, 
was "very muoh adverse to employing General Gordon, mainly on 
the ground that, the movement in the Soudan being religious, the 
appointment of a Christian 1n high command would probably alien-
ate the tribes who remain faithful."19 None the les8 GranVille 
oontinued to exert pre8sure on Cromer to approve sending Gordon, 
e8peeially after the English newspapers began a campaign for 
Gordon as the man to save the Sudan. On January 8, 1884, W. T. 
Stead, tiery editor of the ~ !!!i Gazette and leading stunt 
r-· ~hurohill, The River War, 39. 
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Journalist of his day,20 had interviewed Gordon. On the follow~ 
ing day Stead t s paper ran a front page article headed liChinese 
Gordon for the SUdan,"2l The other papers took up the cry. 
Action was demanded of Gladstone's government by the pres8, by 
British public opinion aroused by the newspapers, and by a large 
section ot Parliament. ¥\eakening in the race of such formidable 
opposition, Cromer at last agreed that Gordon might be able to do 
the job. On January 18, Gordon was sent to the Sudan. 
Gordon's initial assignment was limited in scope. Granville 
telegraphed to Cromer that "the only object of his mission is to 
report on the military situation in the Sudan."22 Gladstone 
heartily approved this restricted oommission. ,-When" the prime 
mini.ter read the above telegram he commented, "if he reports 
what should be done, he should not be the judge who should do i:i 
nor should he oommit us on that point by advice otficially given." 
However, in the instructions which Gordon received from Granville 
he Vi as also authorized to "perform. such other duties as the 
Egrptian Government may desire to intrust to you. n24 This post-
script, aa it were, to Gordon's instructions very soon became 
the main body at the commission because the Egyptian Khedive 
~aplund, Gladstone's Foreign Poliol, 220. 
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immediately appointed reporter Gordon as governor-general of the 
Sudan "with full powers to take whatever steps he may judge best 
for obtaining the end my Government and Her Majesty's Government 
have in view. I could not do more than delegate to Gordon my 
own power and make him irresponsible arbiter of the situation.,,25 
'rb.eEgyptilin governor also outlined the end he had in view in 
appointing Gordon as ruler of the Sudan. "The object of your 
mis s i oli," he w ro te , "is to c arroy in to execu tion the evacua t ion 
of those' territories ••• and ••• to take the necessary steps 
for establishing an organized Goverlll1lent in the different pro-
~ 
the Br!tish governmeut, apparently unwilling to 
thwart the Egyptians, and happy to cede the responsibilit1es in 
the Sudan to Gordon. acquiesed to this extension of Gordonts 
powers. 
Losing no time after his commission by the British govern-
ment on January 18, 1884. Gordon set out for Cairo to report to 
Cromer and the Egyptian Khedive. He lett Cairo on January 26 
tor Khartoum, the c~ ital of the Sudan which is situated at the 
confluenoe at the White :NIle and Blue Nile rivers. February 18 
found him at Khartoum. 
In keeping with the desires of the Egyptian government and 
~he.rles G. 
~. Gordon, £. ~., 
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his own inclinationa, the new governor-general began immediately 
to plan the achievement of hi. two objectives: the evacuation of 
the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan, and the organization of a 
native government to replace the rule of the Mahdi. He had al-
ready decided that the man to rule the Sudan was one Zobehz: 
Paaha, a man with commanding influence in the Sudan. Churchill 
1nf'orma U8 that" on the veI7 day of his arrival at Kb.artoum • • • 
General Gordon sat himself down and telegraphed a formal request 
to Cairo f'or Zubehr Paaha. n21 His plans for evacuation were alao 
quickly made and relayed to Cromer. Inowing that he would need 
outside aid to rescue the people desiring to leave the Sudan, 
Gordon requested the assistance ot British and Indian troops.28 
The anawers which Gordon received to theae requests were a shock 
both to his emotional character and his enthusiasm. He could 
have neither troops nor Zobehr. 
Zobehr waa obviously the man for the Job. Hot only did 
Gordon consider him a ".!..!!!!. qua !l..2!l"29 if the Sudan were to have 
a satisfactory government, but Cromer also approved himas "the 
only possible man;"30 the Egyptian Khedive wal strongly in favor 
ot him, and Gladstone himself, who law in such an appoIntment a 
~IbId •• 42. 
I 
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way to rid himself of the Sudan was a "strong convert" to the 
idea.)l Yet his appointment was not approved. The trouble was 
that Zobehr was a slave trader, 1n fact the best known and most 
successful slave trader in the Sudan. Granville reported to 
Cromer that British "public opinion would not tolerate the ap-
pointment of Zobehr Pasha."32 Despite the powerful argument put 
forth by Gordon that not appointing Zobehr would not eliminate 
the slave trade sinoe it would surely flourish under the Mahdi,3) 
Parliament refused to sanction the appointment. Publio feeling 
1n England was so opposed to slavery that the members ot the 
House of Commons agreed unanimously that "no Government from 
either side ot the Rouse could venture to sanction Zobehr."34 
Sinoe Zobehr was the only man who could handle the job, one of 
the goals for which Gordon had been appointed governor-general 
of the Sudan was rendered impossible. 
Gordon was equally unsuccessful in evacuating the people 
trapped in the Sudan. An idealist and an emotional man whose 
heart went out to every person who mIght be harmed by the Mahdi, 
Gordon's concept ot his assignment differed radically from the 
viewpoint taken by the more practioal minded Cromer and British 
~ 2! Gladstone, III, 1$9. 
Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, 486. 
'. Gordon, Journals. 42. 
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officials in England. Cromer's idea was to make the best of a 
bad situation. As the English agent in Cairo wrote later in his 
memoirs, "General Gordon was not sent to Khartoum with ordera 
that he was to secure the retreat of every man, woman, and ohild 
who wished to leave the Soudan. He was sent to do the best he 
could to oarry out the evacuation."3$ Expressing similar senti-
ments, Lord Granville wrote to Cromer, Maroh 14, 1884, "If Gordon 
can 8 ave the garrisons ot Khartoum, of Berber, and of Dongola 
[the last two cities being situated along the Nile between Khar-
toum and Egypt], it will be in itself a great feat."36 Gordon, 
on the other hand, never oonsidered anything short of total 
evacuation. As a result he not only did not save the people in 
the outlying districts, but he also tailed to bring out the peopl 
in the towns mentioned by GranVille. This oertainly was a size-
able failure since in Khartoum alone there were between ten and 
fiftean thousand persona who wanted to flee to the safety of 
Egypt. 37 
Presuming that the British were honor bound "to e.xtpicat. 
the garrisons whatever it costs,n)8 and that his government would 
send the military force necessary to evacuate the entire Sudan, 
''':3~omer, Modern Egypt, I, 566. 
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Gordon announced on February 27, 1884, that "British troops are 
now on their way to Khartoum."39 1'.b.is proclamation, intended aa 
a morale booster, actually only turned the people ot Khartoum 
against the British and Gordon himselt since it soon became very 
evident that not only were troops not proceeding to Khartoum but 
that the British had no intention ot ever sending any such assis-
tance. Gordon's requests for military aid from ~fig1and, India, 
Egypt, and Turkey were all in turn denied by the British govern-
ment. As early a a May 11, GranVille ordered him to drop the 
idea of evacuating the entire Sudan and "either to report upon, 
or, it feaaible, to adopt, at the first proper moment, measures 
for his 01l1U'emoval and tor that ot the Egyptiana at Khartoum.. n40 
However, Gordon thought he had no honorable choice but "to aee 
evacuation through."41 He remained at Khartoum trying to win the 
support ot various Sudanese oheittains and writing telegrams ,to 
Cromer requesting military asaistance. 
A campaign in England to "save Gordon" had begun as early 
as,March, 1884, both in the press and in the Rouse of Common •• 
Sending a relief expedition waa repeatedly discussed, but any 
such plano matured slowly because cabinet members were deceived 
by Gordon's earlier optimistic reporta that he could leave Khar-
toum anyttme he wiahed, and because Gladatone's attention was 
l~Cromer, Modern EgyPt, I, 568. 
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taken up wi~h other affairs. As late as August, when Gordon was 
no longer ablo even to evacua"te Khartoum because of the encircling 
Mahdist armies, it took the threat of resignation made by Secre-
tary of War Hartington and Chancellor Belborne to force the prime 
minister to ask Commons for 300,000 pounds to enable the govern-
ment "to undertqke operations for the relief of General Gordon 
should they become necess8,ry.,,42 On August 26, a rescue expedi-
tion was finally commissioned, and British hopes that popular 
hero Gordon would be saved began to soar. 
Avidly the Anglish people followed the newspaper reports of 
the advance of this army toward Khartoum. It's progress was 
compared with the rapidly increasing danger to Gordon from the 
Mahdlst forces beseiging him. 'lhe utuation had the suspense of 
a pulp magazine thriller. However, the race was won by t..'1.e 
Mahdlsts who took Khartoum on January 26, 1885. Gordon was killed 
immedIately and his head sent to Mohammed Ahmed. The British 
army was still two hundred miles away. 
Horrified at the brutal death of their hero and disgraced 
because they had not saved him, the British people raised their 
un1ted voices to demand all out war against the ML~di. On the 
very day that news of the fall of Khartoum reached London, the 
Times demanded "upholding the national honour at any cost.,,43 
~ir J. A. R. Marriot, England Since Waterloo (London, 1925) 
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Such was the onslaught of public opinion that Gladstone's govelttn-
ment was forced to reverse its policy in the Sudan. Non-inter-
vention h~d bean overwhelmingly condemned; the people demanded a 
war to b16 finiah. With a vote of censure pending 1n Parliament. 
Secretary of War liartington telegraphed the command to Lord 
Wolselel in the Sudan, Feb~~ary 9. 1885: "the power of the Mahd1 
at Khartoum must be over thrown."44 T.hirteen thousand British 
and Indian troops were d1spa tched to the Sudan to '1 smash the 
Mandi" by the government which one year before had refused to 
send a Single British soldier to evacuate Egyptian garrisons and 
civilians. A railroad wasbegun from the Red Bea to the Nile to 
show the Sudanese and the British people "the fact that we are 
in earr.u":uat. and do not mean to leave the country until we have 
re ... established order and a. settled government at Khartoum.,,45 
The Cabinet realized that only an aggressive offensive in the 
Sudan would satis~J the wounded pride of Parliament and the Bri-
tish nation. :Cherefore, throughout February anti March everything 
possible wa.s done to effect mat Lord Wolseley called 9. "counter 
poise to the Malldils capture of Khartomn. ,,46 
~~e storm or publio opinion aroused by the fall of Khartoum 
and the death of Gordon had begun to die down by the end ot Maroh. 
28 
Pressure from the le~t wing Radicals in Parliament began to swing 
Gladstone's government back toward its own less expensive "hands 
offn policy in the SUdan.47 '!b.a prime minister, who had approved 
the decision to overthrow the Mahdi only because of the overpow-
erin~ force o~ public opinion and parliamentary opposition, now 
willingly began to look for an excuse for baok1n~ out of the 
Sudan. ~le opportunity came on April 8th when news reached Londo 
that Russian troops had battle with and beaten the Afghans at 
the battle of Penjdeh. An invasion of India by !tussie. seemed 
inevi table. In the panic Th ich resulted in London, interest in 
the Sudan vanished. Jumpin~ at his chance, GladAtone 1mmediately 
becanto end hostilities in the SUdan. On April 13. Lord Hart-
ington wired to Wolseley, "In the condition of imperial affairs 
it is probo.ble th9.t the e xped1.tion to Khartoum :may have to be 
abandoned, and tho troops brought back as 800n as possible to 
Egypt. n48 Al~ost at once British troops along the Nile began to 
retire into Egypt. Two days later orders were issued from London 
to suspend the construction of the railroad.49 . By Apr!l 21, a11---
Drltish offensive action in the budan had ~eased; by May 8, Bri-
tish policy was to limit military activ1ties to defending the 
Marriott, England Since Waterloo, 505. 
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Egyptian border;SO soon even this fighting was left to Egypt, 
and the British were out of the war. British policy, which had 
changed overnight 1n February from disinterest in the Sudan to 
an all out campaign to conquer it, underwent this second about 
face in April. In February the British government had issued a 
proclamation to the people of the Sudan to the effect that they 
intended "to destroy the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum."5l Two 
months later the British ceded the Sudan to the enemy_ 
No further large scale offensives were undertaken in the 
Sudan until 1896. During the intervening years the Mahdist 
government retained control of the Sudan except for the land 
bordering the Red Sea. About three-quarters of the Red Sea lit-
toral remained under Egyptian control in 188S. The remainder of 
the coast was wrested from the Sudanese in 1891 when the British 
felt the Egyptian army was sufficiently well trained to attempt 
an offensive. On February 19th of that year, two thousand 
Egyptian soldiers, wi th British permission and British officers, 
defeated a Mahdist army of seven thousand, inflicting 700 death. 
while lOSing only ten men.52 
In the same year another step was initiated which presup-
posed the ultimate inclusion of the Sudan in the British empire. 
Preliminary plans were laid for taking Uganda which contains the 
~ .. t~~~'f ~., 29 • 
.. ! .!lli., 26. 
I 
'\' J 1'heobald,!ill!. Mahdiya, 168-169. 
)0 
head waters of the Nile. Lord Salisbury, British prime minister 
at the time (August" 1886 - August, 1892), was an imperialist who 
"was laready thinking of the ultimate reconquest of the Sudan.n53 
He sent out surveyors to determine the feasibility and cost of a 
railroad from Mombasea on the coast to Lake Victoria. However, 
little else was done directly by the government to take over 
Uganda. The high cost of war persuaded the English to annex this 
country more slowly through the instrumentality of the Imperial 
East Africa Company. In 1894, When the oompany definitely oon-
trolled Uganda, prime minister Rosebery, an even more ardent 
imperialist than Salisbury, transferred the government from the 
hands of the trade company to the British government. The land 
became a protectorate of the British empire. England then con-
trolled both extremeties of the Nile, and the imperialist urge 
challenged them to take the connecting link. 
That this final step would be taken eventually, there was 
little doubt. Lord Cromer writes that if he had been asked he 
would have set the date ror reconquering the Sudan at about 
1910.54 In any case it seems certain that he did not on Maroh, 
1), 1896, expect to be informed that the British government had 
decided on the previous day to invade the Sudan. Just a rew 
weeks before, the Governor-General had given orders to begin the 
'(! ~Langer, Diplonacl 2! Imperialism, 118 • 
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first of a series of projected reservoirs along the Nile in 
Egypt, a decision whioh Lord Kitchener, British commander or the 
Egyptian army and advocate of war in the Sudan, had taken as a 
clear indication that war had defInitely been put orf.55 It was 
not the season for desert wart"are. The hot summer wi th its ener-
vating heat was just beginning; the Nile was low making travel 
in the Sudan very diffiou1t; away from the Nile drinking water 
would be non-existent. At such a time invasion was certainly t"ar 
from Cromer's mind, but on that Friday morning a telegram t"rom 
London ordered him to send the Egyptian army up the Nile into 
the Sudan. 
In London the decision had been hatching for over a week. 
An oecasion for invasion was at hand. On March 1, the Italians 
had been badly defeated by the Abyssinian. whose land Italy was 
trying to invade. It was stated that unless Egypt attacked the 
Sudanese along the Nile, the latter might mass their forces 
against the already harraaaed Italian colony of Eritria which 
had been extending into the eastern Sudan. Giving the reason, 
therefore, that they had been invited to create a diversion to 
relieve the pressure on the Italian army, the British sent Kitch-
ener and his Egyptian army up the Nile as fara. the town of 
Dongola, some two hundred miles into the interior of the Sudan. 
This decision could not be carried into eft"ect until the end 
'¢ Churchill, Rl ver !!£. 100. 
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of Ap:ril. Plans had to be laid, the a rmy gathered, money ob-
tained. All these matters ware left in the hands of Cromer, 
Kichaner, and the Egyptians, since England preferred to treat the 
expedition as an Egyptian affai:r which would primarily benefit 
Egypt. The British War Office "only spoke when spoken to and 
accepted no responsibility."56 The money and men necessa:ry for 
the offensive were to come entirely from Egypt. This was possi-
ble since Lord Kitchener had trained a very competent Egyptian 
army and the Egyptian treasury contained a surplus of 2,500,000 
pounds. 57 Il'he only financial complication arose from the fact 
that Egypt's treasury was controlled by an international debt 
couml1ssion on which Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Russ 1a 
were equally represented. However, the requested 500,000 pounds 
were approved by a 3-2 majority ot the commission, Germany and 
Italy voting with Britain. So the war was on. 
With the Egyptian troops supported by Egyptian funds, Lord 
Kitehener advanced up the Nile toward Dongola. The elements pro-
vided the only formidable opposition. A cholera epidemic cost 
the invaders 343 lives. Contrary winds on the Hile for 40 oon-
seoutive days, and floods unequ.ll~d in 50 years, oaused delay.58 
~. ' J..:leobald, !!l!. Mahdiya, 190. 
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The Mahdist torces, on the other hand, were ineffective against 
the well trained EgyptIans. In a typical battle 1500 Dervishes 
retired before only 240 Egyptians.59 By September 23, Kitchener 
had taken Dongola with military oasualites for the whole oampaign 
amounting only to 169.60 
Alm~t a year elapsed after the fall of Dongola before any 
further advance up the Nile was made. However, that the British 
1ntended further conquest is clear. One indication is that soon 
after the capture of Dongola, a railroad was begun at the Egypt. 
Sudan border whlch was to extend to a polnt on the Nile two hun-
dred miles beyond Dongola. Kitchener bullt this rallroad so that 
he could more easily move troops and supplles into the depths of 
the Sudan. 'The interlude of inaction was not so muoh a perlod 
of indeoision as a time in whlch greater support for the campaign 
could be amassed in England. This was neoessar7 since it had 
become evident that the war would require both British troops and 
British gold. 
Eoonomically, Britain ran into a major problem during this 
perlod. The Egyptian Debt Commission's grant of 500,000 pounds 
for the Dongola expedition had been protested by France to an 
international court of appeal, on the groun that Egyptian surplus 
nb
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funds were to be devoted only to public works of a per~~nent 
character and not to financing a war.6l On December 2, 1896, the 
court ordered the Egyptian government to rofund the money to the 
Caisse ~ ~ Detta. 'fhe British government, at the request of 
Cromer, repaid the money, a move which defeated Franca but whiCh 
also dismayed many close-pursed EngliShmen. 62 This, plus the 
prospect of fur·thar expenses (the British subsequently loaned 
Egypt 800,000 pouods63 ) and of using English soldiers in the 
Sudan (eight battalions of British infantry, a regiment of caval-
ry, and a battery of field artillery were sent in 189764) go far 
toward explaining the lapse of time necessary for the British 
cabinet to win parliamentary approval for further advance into 
th.a Sudan. 
In late SUllL."'1ler, 1897, the marcil toward Khartoum began. One 
army continued up the Nile while another converged on Khartoum 
from the Red Sea, pacifying the eastern Sudan as it came. By 
December, 1897, the Kassala region, east of Khartoum, was in 
Egyptian hands. On September 2, 1898, Khartoum itself was taken 
in s. battle in which Kitchener with a torce ot 23.000 men massa-
cred a Sudanese army of 50,000. Thirty thousand of the detendill3 
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army were killed while the atitackers lost only ,50 men. 65 
~~.diately after his victory at Khartoum,Kitchener pushed 
on up the YHle toward a village named Fas~loda, over 300 miles 
further up the river. The reason for his haste was that the 
French were at temp ting there to pu t sou thern Sudan Ul'lder li'rench 
rule. Eight Fr'enchmen and 120 I1egro soldiers had arrived there 
on July 10, 1898, led by the Frenchman, Major Marchand. They had 
reached Fashoda only after a march of over two years, having 
started out in February, 1896, just a few weeks before the Bri-
tish ha.d sent Ki tcher .. er into the ~h:dan. Marchand was to have met 
at the Nile two larger boOdies of troops coming fI'om Abyssinia. 
T:':1.ese reinforcements never arrived, one group because it had no 
boats in which to cross the rivers ar~d swamps that lay in its 
path, the o~her because of rever.66 Marchand, however, raised 
tl.'lO French flag at F'ashoda and declared Ii. Flreneh protectorate 
over the territory. 
After Kitchener'. arrival. the ft1renoh government saw they 
could not hold their position on the Nile without declaring war 
on England. For a time the two countries were olose to VI ar, 67 
but the French on November 4, 1898. abruptly gave way. announcing 
that the Marchand m1ssion would be withdrawn. Cn December 11, 
"/ ~El1e Halevy. A History of the "'ngl1sh PeO~l" in the Nine-
teenth Centurl, trans. E. r. Watr~(London, 195 ), V; sn:----
.,C) ¢Moon, Imperialism.!ill! World Politics, 152. 
~b1d., 153. 
I
r's
. /  .. ll , !lI h ngU8 0Ile
the small French force which had reached its destination only 
after fighting its way through jungles and swamps a.nd bra.ving 
death from fever and savages on a journey comparable in length 
to a trip from New York to San Francisco, sadly left Fashoda for 
~~ance. Marchand's departure left the Sudan under Kitchener's 
und5.sputed control. Mopping up operatIons took another year, but 
hy that t:!.r:'le t~1e future government of the Sudan had already been 
determined. 
On ,January 19 J 1899 J Lord Cromer and the EGYPtian foreign 
minister signed the Anglo-Ee:yptian Agreement which decreed what 
government the Sudan was to have. The type of goverr~ent decided 
upon was called a n condominium," which Cro.mer described as a 
"hybrid fo~m of government, hitherto unknown to international 
jUrisprUdence.,,68 The Sudan was to be ruled jointly by ,u,ngland 
~~d Egypt. It was a pa.rtnership arrangement, with the important 
reservation that England was the senior pa.rtner a..Yld Egypt a poor 
second. Vthen Kitchener took Kharto'U.'!l, he had been instructed to 
hoist the Union Jack and the Egyptian flag sida by side.69 How-
ever, this show of equality was belied by such 0 f'ficial messages 
from prime minister Salisbury as the followIng one sent to Cromer 
on August 2, 1898: "Her Majesty's Gover~~eDt consider that they 
.J)' ~ffcromer, ModeM'! Egypt, II, 115. 
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have a predominant voice in all ~atters oonnected with the Sudan, 
and that they expect that any advice which they rJB.Y thInk fit to 
tender to the Egyptian Government 1n respect to Suda.n affairs wll 
be followed." 70 
For all practical purposes, thon, the Sudan became a part or 
the Bri tish emp1.re in 1899. Its s ta tl1S rOMaln~d un~l:1an.~ed until 
February 12, 1953, when Brt ta in and Egypt ended the condm:l1nhllll 
by an a~rui)ment which r;a.ve tho British thr8e years in whicl:1 to 
turn the r;overnment over to the Sudanese who were to decide with-
in the same period whether they wanted autonomy or un10n with 
Egypt. As subsequent evonts havo shown, the Sudanese have chosen 
independence, and they are now experimenting with democracy in 
the manner of a small child vii th a mechanical toy 1 t f~nds a t-
tractive ~t does not know how to operate. 
The Sri tish exits and er.trances'in the Sudan mal::e nn iYltri-
cate and intlgulng story. In this cha:~ter their lJ.~_3 tory <Juring 
th~ last two c ecaCias of the nineteenth century has teen out11ned, 
with some rpferences to indivlduals e.nc roroup~ rosponslble for 
the policies of Gre[·t Brlta1n tn the Sl~dan. The Influene~ of 
Eri tlsh pub 1 tc opinion, of certain ~_ndt "tdnal s t.ates':1€l!1, nne, of 
Parliament as a body, were all mentioned in ccmncctton with cer-
ta:'.n moves made e1 ther in the direction towal'd or awe.y from 
imperialism in the Suda.n. Chapter III will deal more j1::'6c1s011' 
wi th the problem of where to lay the responslb111.ty for the 
aotivities of Britain in the Sudan. 
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CHAPTER III 
PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE AS POLICY MAKERS 
When George Washington's father noticed that a cherry tree 
was missing from his front lawn, the first question that popped 
into his mind was probably, "Who did it?" Only when that problem 
had been satisfactorily solved would he think of investigating 
the reasons behind the deed. Without a clear answer to the first 
question, all thought about the second would habe been mere spec-
ulation, necessarily vague and subject to error. Similarly, in 
this study of British imperia11sm common sense demands that we 
link up each move toward or away from imperialism in the Sudan 
with definite individuals or groups. It would by no means be 
sufficient to remain content with such statements as "the British 
extended their empire" or "the British .~nt their armies into the 
Sudan." Here the words which must be clarified before any study 
'of motivation can intelligently be pursued are "the British." Do 
we mean to hold respona1ble for Britain's actions in the Sudan 
certain British pr1me ministers, the British parliament, the Bri-
tish army, the British voters, several of theae groupa, all of 
them, or wham? 
This question ia not extraordinarily difficult to answer, 
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but it does demand the examination of each power group which 
could possibly be involved before an adequate answer can be 
given. Because some au~~ors have stressed the influence of but 
one or other grouP. needless confusion and the errors conse~uent 
to oversimplIfication mark their books. The writings of other 
men give the reader an abundance of useful information about the 
cauaes of British imperialism, but regularly omit any distinc-
tions between causes of major import and those which are minor, 
between proximate and remote causes, between causes and occasions. 
In this chapter the quest is for the persons, groups, and 
classes of people who were the really Significant, proximate 
_kents responsible for Britain's treatment of the Sudan in the 
latenineteenth century. Study of the a .... ailabl. sources make it 
possible to reduce these to two poliCY dete~ining groups, the 
British government and the British public. Other agents, for 
example, the armies of the British empire, the English press, the 
Egyptian government, and the various European powera, are also 
important, but not precisely a8 primary erficient causes of Bri-
tish imperialism. Rather they can be ;ermed either inrluences 
on the two principle agents, or as instruments by which imperial 
policies .ere carried out, as for example the military forces 
which actually fought 1n the Sudan. 
The really controversial issue which needs clarification 
here is the proper degree of importance to be given to the parts 
played on the one hand by the British government and on the 
other by the English people. Britaints act. of imperialism were 
due immediately to the decisions of the men who controlled Parli-
ament. However, since these statesmen were elected, their actions 
had to meet with some degree of public approval and would to some 
extent be influenoed by the will of the people. It is neoessary, 
therefore, to study the relative importance, and the interaction, 
of the government and the governed with regard to the actions 
taken in the Sudan. Such is the problem with which this chapter 
is concerned. 
Many aocounts of nineteenth century British im.perialism give 
the ImpressIon that Britain deter.mined her foreign policy by 
popular acclaim. EVen a careful reader may be mislead by the 
emphaaia given to the popularity or unpopularity of a Parliamen-
tary decision. Tne way authors describe the growth of imperial 
enthusiasm throughout England tends to the conclusion that the 
British government was conduoted not in the House of Commons but 
rather in a modern day oounterpart of the Athenian assembly. 
The contention here is that it is more important to study 
the views on imperialism held by the men who made up the British 
Parliament at the ttme than to conoern oneself with the opinions 
on the same subjeot of the English publio. In the really impor-
tant deoisions regarding British imperial expansion in the Sudan, 
historical souroes seem to justify the statement that the 
strength of popular opinion was usually overshadowed by the 1n-
i 
fluenoe of the men in oontrol of the British government. 'l'his !! 
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does not mean that public opinion need not be considered at all, 
but just as itlis the officers of an army who determine when the 
force is to fight, where the battle is to be staged, and wheth.~ 
it is to enter the combat or not, so in a similar fashion it was 
the British Parliament much more than the English people that 
directed the country's imperial policy. 
Great Britain had two major political parties during the 
period under oonsideration. There was the Conservative party 
which, despite what its name might imply, was the group more in-
clined toward initiating imperial ventures. Opposed to this 
party were the Liberals who tended more to cling to the older 
idea of tree trade and the independence of small nations. The 
Liberal party was in power fram 1880 to l88S, the period during 
which the Sudan was twioe abandoned. Sudan for the Sudanese was 
the policy advocated by the Liberals, a pOSition held despite 
strong opposition from Egypt and the British publio. 
To ascertain the political platform of the Liberals during 
these years is comparatively easy since it was largely the plat-
form of one man, William Ewart Gladstone. As party leader, Glad. 
stone was prime minister during the first five years of the 
1880's. His accession to command in the British government 
brought to power a man who had little or no interest in imperial 
expansion. He was interested in trade, not territory. Colonies 
were, in hi. opinion, a needle.s burden and an outmoded method ot 
governmellt. A.an advocate of tree-trade he expected tb,!lt Ll(; 
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empire would gradually disintegrate. Finding such a prospect 
attractive rather than otherwise, he was "willing to aid the pro-
cess by tho ex.tension of self-Bovernment" to countries 1n the 
British empire, as Langer says.l 
Gladstone probably would never have anotloned any interven-
tion in Egypt 1f he had not felt compelled to protect the Br1tish 
1nvestments 1n the Suez made by his more imperial minded prede. 
cessor in the offioe of prime min1ster, Benjamin ~israeli.2 In 
September, 1882, the British government assumed control of Egypt, 
but from this date until the end of Gladstonets time in office 
the main theme of British policy in Egypt was to cast off this 
country from the empire as 800n as possible. Cnruchill write. 
that "every act, whether of war or administration • • • [was] 
tntended to be final. Every dispatCh ••• [was] direoted to 
breaking the connection between the two countries and winding up 
~~e severed atring.H) 
All questions regarding the Sudan appeared to Gladstone as 
wea.risome interference with his htopes for an earlY' end to British 
involvement in Egyptian lovernment affairs. ~hroughout the en-
suing years Gladstone's government tried to ignore the Sudan 
situation &8 muoh as possible. In the opinion of these men the 
lLanger, Diplomaot 2! Imperialism, 70. 
2Bo• en, Conflict .2! !!!i !!!9. !.!.!! !!! EgYpt, 86. 
)ChrUchill, River War, 37-38. 
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Sudan wa.s more bother than :tt was worth. This state of mind is 
aptly, though rather sarcastically, caricatured in General Gor-
don's diary. Gordon puts into the mouths of the Liberal leaders 
such statements as, "That brute of a Mandll ••• [HeJ wl11 
destroy all the well earned repose of Her Majesty's Government.-4 
Again in the same vein Gordon has Gladstone's government comment 
on the subject of the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan which Gor-
don was trying to evacuate. "Those horrid garrisons • • • They 
ought to have surrendered at once, troublesome people that they 
are, giving so much botherlnS 
Fairness to Gladstone demands that it also be added that his 
concept of nationalism was that ea.ch nation, small or large, had 
a right to its independence. The Sudan, he said, was Ita nation 
richtly struggling to be free.,t Gladstone looked on the Mahdist 
rebellion as a na.tionalist movement. He considered Egypt a cruel 
and unjust aggressor in the Sudan, and an aggressor, moreover, 
whose proprietary claima eould not be backed up by longstanding 
or thorough conquest. 
"It is no part of the duty incumbent upon us to restore 
order in the Sudan. n6 Such were the sentiments expressed b7 
Gladstone on November 2, 1882. Having expressed his mind, hi. 
4Gordon, Journals, 54. 
5 Ibid., 50-51. 6-
Mo~ley, ~~ Gladstone, III, 146. 
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only desire was to forget the Sudan and give himself exclusively 
to the business of domestic government. However, he was not al-
lowed to shake himself tree of the Sudan question so easily. 'l'h. 
opposition party In the government, more fervently imperialistic, 
and apparently ready to use the situation in the Sudan as a step-
ping stone to political power, was clamoring for interterence in 
the Sudan. Gladstone could ignore public opinion, but not a vote 
of c ensure in Parliament. This imminent danger to the Liberal 
party'. security goes far toward explaining the first of the 
token steps Gladstone took in the direction of imlJerla11sm In the 
Sudan. 
This first step was his approval of sending Gordon to the 
Sudan. His reason was not 80 much to save the Sudanese as it was 
to save himself and his party. In January, 1884, a vote of cen-
sure was pending in Parliament. The motion was finally presented 
on February 12, 1884, but by this date Gordon was already on his 
way to Khartoum. Beoause at this bow to tmperialism, Gladstone 
survi ved the censure. 
ihe prime m1ni8te~ hop~d that the appointment of General 
Gordon to the task of investigating conditions in the Sudan would 
prove an easy way out of a troublesome situation. The Liberals 
hoped that Gordon too would decide the best that could be done in 
the Sudan was the evacuation of Khartoum. 7 Such a deciSion, made 
7Marriott. Er£land Since Waterloo, 50). 
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not by the L1beral government but by a man chosen by the Conserv-
atives and approved by popular opinion, would have made it possi-
B ble tor Gladstone to p1geon hole the Sudan problem. 
When Gordon tailed to oblige the British government by set-
tling for a part1al evacuation of the Sudan, Gladstone was very 
upset, but his policy ot nonintervention in the Sudan remained 
unchanged. He was determined that "under no conceivable circum-
stancea" would he "employ a soldier in the Sudan."9 To Glad-
stone's demand that he come out of the Sudan with the garrison at 
Khartoum, Gordon responded that he would not because to a bandon 
the other garrisons throughout the country would be an act of 
"national dishonour. nlO Even this attempt to torce Gladstone to 
send troops to the Sudan did not Shake the Prime Minister's re-
.olve to stay out, and when Gordon could no longer leave Khartoum 
because the Mahdists had surrounded ht., Gladstone refused to 
send in British troops either to r •• cue Gordon or to save the 
garrisons and other people trapped in the Sudan. He had been 
forced to make one conce8aion to imperialism when he approved the 
sending ot Gordon, he would not be so compromised again if he 
could avoid it. The people, the press, the Queen heraelt, de-
clared that national honor was involved with the fate of General 
6Theobald, ~ Mahdiza, 76. 
9cromer, ~odern EgYpt, I, 386. 
l°Marriott, England Since Waterloo, 504. 
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Gordon. In answer, Gladstone asserted with fiery emphasis in the 
Rouse of Commons that the invasion of the Sudan would be a war ot 
conquest against a people fighting for freedom. "Yes, those peo-
ple are struggling to be free," he proclaimed, "and they are 
rightly struggling to be free."ll 
It appeared for a time that Gladstone had conquered the 
appeal for a rescue of Gordon. a. had ignored the newspapers and 
popular opinion; he had stood up to the oPPosition party in par-
liament.12 It was only when members of his own cabinet threat-
ened to resign unless aid were sent to Gordon that Gladstone was 
forced to permit further British interference in the Sudan. To 
prevent the resignation of his secretary of war, Lord Hartington, 
and of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, Gladstone at last 
approved a small re.cue expedition consisting of only a slngle 
brigade. But just as his conce.sion to. end Gordon "to report" 
on conditions in the Sudan had grown into the appointment ot 
Gordon as governor-general of the Budin with power to evacuate 
the entire territory and to organize the government of the land, 
so now this one brigade quickly became an army of ten thousand 
men, selected from the whole army.1) Once Gladstonets decIsIon 
was announced to the nation and the attention of all England was 
11 Strachey, ~ Victorians, 267. 
12Ibid ., 275. 
13Churchill, _Ri ..... v ..... e_r !!r., 59-60. 
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centered on it, it was tmpossible to deny the demands of the offi-
cers in oharge of the mission. 
Still Gladstone was determined that this rescue expedition 
should not become a conquering army. He d.sired that the expedi-
tion take as little time as possible and leave no trace of its 
existence behind it. He would not approve the idea of building 
a railroad in the Sudan as part of the rescue plan. For him such 
a notion contained "the most formidable difficulties of a moral 
and political kind. lt14 He feared that the "turning of the first 
sad" of s uoh a :railway would be the beginning of Brl t1sh domi-
nation in the Sudan, an eventuality which h. considered complete-
ly unjustifiable and wholly undeSirable. 
When the expedition failed to save Gordon, a situation aro.e 
in England whioh forced Gladstone to make his third, last, and 
great.st compromise .. th his anti-imperialist principles. Here 
especially authors assert that it was publio opinion which forced 
Gladstone to permit a full scale ofrensive in the Sudan. A. B. 
Theobald asserts that nthe remarkably strong reaction of publio 
opinion in England to the l' all of Khartoum and the death of Gor-
don • • • largely explains the oourse of government policy imme-
diately subsequent to the news."15 But public opinion alone 
would not have daunted Gladstone. It to the voice of the people 
l4Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreisa Policy, 238. 
15Theobald, ~ Mahdiya, 123. 
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had not been added the recurrent danger of a vote of censure, 
Gladstone might well have maintained his anti-imperial policy. 
It was the wounded pride and political manuevering of Parliament 
that Gladstone had to worry about rather than the clamor of pub-
lic opinion. Subsequent events show that the intense public 
interest in avenging the death of Gordon was of very short dura-
tion. Certainly if Gladstone had had only the British populace 
to talk down he could have done 80. 
After only three months, and without any real oonquests by 
BritaIn, Gladstone was able to call off the offensive in the 
Sudan. On the 28th of February, the government weathered another 
VOt0 of censure in Parliament. In the following month, Gladstone 
took the ocoasion of possible danger from the Russians in Afghan-
istan to begin to pull British troops out of the Sudan. By April 
15, 1885, the government had made public its decision to abandon 
most of the Sudan. Within another month the entire offensive had 
been oalled off and all British and Egyptian troops began to re-
tire from the Sudan. 
It is interesting to note that such a withdrawal went counte 
to the desires of the Queen and of the more fa.natical of the 
British public,16 but by this time Gladstone had been able to 
convInce Parliament that evaouation waa the wiseat move to make. 
Onoe he had made it olear that he was for abandoning the Sudan, 
16 Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign PolloZ, 244. 
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the opposition feared to push their policy of conquest too hard 
lest it end in ruin tor Great Britain, in which case the blame 
tor the disaster would be alid to their account. They could 8ee 
the torce of Gladstone'. argument that "While we remain tor war 
in the Sudan all the world can bully us, and they have come to 
know It.nl7 
It should be mentioned here that on the oocasions when the 
Conservatives threatened to oust Gladstone's government by votes 
of oensure, their hope was that the people would approve their 
resistance to the party in power. Public opinion was'for 't:bem .. 
foroe to be used to fur~ler their own aims, control of Parliament 
and the furtherance of their d eaire for imperial expansion. On 
the other hand, since the Liberals were in control of Parliament 
through popular vote, it obviously had public approval to start 
with. It would, therefore, be easier tor the Liberals to retain 
the popularity they possessed than for their political opponents 
to wrest it from ~em. 
When Gladstone was succ •• ded as prime minister in June, 1885. 
by the Oonservative party leader, Lord Salisbury, opposition to 
imperialisM was waning in the British government. During the 
remaining 15 years ot the nineteenth century, the Liberals, nevep 
completely separated trom their anti.imperial tenets, held the 
reins or government only tor two briet periods, totalling a little 
r 
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less than three and one half years. Moreover, even during these 
tew years of power Gladstone, who still lead his party dur1ng most 
of this time, found his following splitting up over the issue of 
imperialism. His most formidable antagonist within the Liberal 
party was the outspoken advocate of imperial expansion, Lord Roae 
bery, Gladstone t s most important rival for party leaderah1.p and 
the man who assumed control of the party 1n 1894. 
Rosebery, who as secretary of foreign affairs under Glad-
stone, forced h!e captian to g'ive up the idea of evacuatlng Egypt 
18 in 1892, openly decried Gladstone's "Little Englander" ways. 
In a speech which he delievered on October 25, 1894, Rosebery 
deplored the "party of a small England, of a shrunk England, of a 
degraded England, of a neutral Eneland, of a submissive England!~ 
The fact tl~t Rosebery gained control' of the Liberal party over 
Gladstone showed that imperialism was winning out over free-trade 
and independence for small nations in Parliament. 
Rosebery saw Great Britain's place as the greatest world 
power threatened by the imperialism of France and. the efficiency 
. 
of Germany.20 In 1888 he championed colonialism in a spe~ch in 
which he pointed out that "we formerly did not h!lnre in Ollr fol"-
eign affairs to trouble ourselves with colDnial qu~gtionB, because 
18 Langer. Diplomacy 2! Imperialism, 124. 
19 !!ti.1., 78. 
20 
George Malcolm Young, Victorian England: Portrait 2! !a 
(Garden City, N.Y., 195~), 246. 
we had a monopoly of oolonies. 21 That monopoly has oeased. tt He 
continued to show himself inimioal to Gladstone's platform 1n 
1893, when he was atill Gladstone's fore1gn secret&r7, by arguing 
tor turther imper1al expans10n 1n an address to the Colonial In-
st1tute. On th1s oocas1on he denied that tbe British emp1re was 
large enough to supply the future needs of England. He stated 
that "we are engaged at the present moment, the language ot m1n-
1ng. t1n pegging out claims tor the future.' We have to consider 
not what we want now, but what we shall want 1n the future. n22 
In 1900, Rosebert was st1ll preaoh1ng 1mperialist doctr1ne as h1. 
address to the students ot the Un1versity at Glasgow shows. In 
th1s speech, a forthright exposition of nationalism and 1mper1al-
iSM, he cried out exultantly that "we are a oonquer1ng and imper-
ial race. Allover the world we have displayed our mettle. We 
have discovered and annexed and governed vast territories. 
W. have 1noculated the universe with our institut1ons. tt23 
• • • 
F1nall 
in 1909, he is to be found exhorting the delegates of an 1mpel'ial 
preas conterenoe to return to the1r homes as "missionaries of Em-
pire--miss1onar1ea of the most extensive and the moat unselfish 
Emp1re which 1s known to history."24 In following such a leader 
the L1berals were certainly accept1ng ideas diametrically opposed 
21Langer, Diplomacy g! Imper1alism, 77. 
22~., 124. 
23Ib1d., 78. 
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to those ot Gladstone. 
~~e Conservative party, which was in power during the entire 
period during whiCh the Sudan was finally conquered and incorp-
orated into the British empire, was unitedly imperialistio. The 
man at the head of this party and Who, therefore, was the Con-
servative prime minister during the three periods 1n which this 
party was in power in the last twenty years of the nineteenth 
century, was Lord Salisburr. For Salisburr the reconquest of the 
Sudan dominated all questions regarding British policy in Egypt~4 
His interest in Uganda, for whose inclusion in the British empire 
he was largely responsible, was motivated by a desire to control 
the whole of the Nile River valley.25 Salisbury's concern, like 
Gladstone's, was with trade, but he differed from Gladstone in 
believing that English economy would be better served by the ex-
tenaion at empire and monopoly ot trade within imperial lands 
than by tree trade and dissolution of colooie •• 26 In 1895, when 
Salisbury became prime minis·ter for the third time he had behind 
him a government strongly in favor of imperialism in general and 
of reconqueat ot the Sudan in particular. His position was so 
strong that there was little danger of his losing control of the 
24Lord Rosebery, Miscellanies: Literary and Historioal 
(London, 1921), II, 2.37. ---
25 Langer, Dip10macl 2! ImEerlalism 110. 
26Ib1d., 118. 
27 Ibid., 79. 
government before he had realized any plans for imperialism he 
might have devised.28 As a matter of fact, he remained prime 
minister until 1902, by which time the Sudan issue had been deter 
mined deoidedly in favor of imperialism. 
By 1890 the British government was definitely inclining 
toward the eventual absorption of the Sudan into the British em-
pire. Less hesitation or reluctance was shown toward using Bri-
tish troops in the Sudan, at least during the periods of Conserv-
ative government. In 1888, a small British foroe was sent to the 
Sudanese ooast to drive off Mahdist troops then beseiging the 
Egyptian held port.29 These troops were sent despite the faot 
that the Egyptians could have handled the situation unassisted, a 
way of aoting quite at varianoe with Gladstonets opposition to 
sending a single British soldier into the Sudan even when suoh 
intervention was the only way in which General Gordon or the tens 
of thousands of Egyptians trapped in the Sudan could be saved. 
Again in 1889 British troops were sent to help repulse an attempt. 
ed Mahdist invasion of Egypt, though here again their presence 
was not necessary.JO 
In 1891, Salisbury's government decided to sanotion an 
Egyptian military advance southward along the Red Sea coast into 
28 Ohurchill, River !!£, 99. 
290romer, Modern Eglpt, II, 63. 
30 Ibid., 68. 
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Mahdist held territory. This sudden reversal of the British 
policy of abandonment established by Gladstone indicates clearly 
the parts played by government and people In many of Britain's 
decisions regarding imperialism. The offensive was motivated 
primarily by the Conservative party·. desire to bring under Bri-
tish control the entire Sudanese Red Sea littoral. They saw an 
opportunity to do so when Uthman Diqna. the Mandist commander in 
that sector, was off on a tax collecting expedition accompanied 
by his armw. Success here would not only put all the financially 
important ports of the Sudan in British hands but also would help 
to open the way for more extensive oonquest of the Sudan. A 
secondary oonsiderat1.on was the effect this move would have on 
publio opinion. Like any militarT venture, there was the possi-
bility of failure, which, tn this case, might turn the British 
people against the Conservative government and occasion its quick 
collapse in favor of the Liberal party. Howev$r, if the Egyptian 
armies were Victorious, Salisbury felt confident that the British 
would be so delighted by the manifestation of their country's 
power that they would give inoreased support to the Conservative 
party and not notice at all the change or policy so little war-
ranted by condItions 1n the Sudan.)l 
The people of Great Britain were not even informed of the 
move until 1t was made. Bor would the invasion have been popular 
if announced beforehand, since not only was it a military offen-
sive entered into suddenly without any special pretext for war,32 
but it was also a step to be taken by a still only partially 
trained Egyptian army and supported financially by an Egyptian 
treasury as yet only cOllvalescent. The British people, then, did 
not suggest or sanotion the offensive beforehand, and afterwards 
theywere easily satisfied as to the moral aspects of the move as 
long as their armies were in any way victorious. 
When the reconquest of the Nile valley began in 1896, again 
public opinion was not consulted, nor was the plan inaugurated in 
any way by popular acclaim. Here again the deoision was mad. 
solely by Parliament. Although the statesmen responsible for 
this course of action felt confident they oould arouse public 
approval of the plan once it was underway, thi9 was more a condi-
tion than a cause of their action. They were motivated primarily 
by a fear that the Frenoh would take over the Sudan unless they 
moved quickly. The government, therefore, made the decision for 
the British people, and relegated to a secondary position the 
problem of what the people would think of their action. 
Several facts show clearly that the decision to oommence re-
oonquest of the Sudan was made independently of, and to some 
extentin opposition to, public opinion. In preparation for the 
invasion, prime minister Salisbury went counter to the will of 
32~ •• 166. 
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the people by pursu tng a conc!.liatory policy towards Russia, a. 
s tra tegem w:'1.ose l)UrpOSe TI as to wean this cotL.'1try away from Pranoe 
so that when the Anglo-French clash in the Sudan would occur, the 
French would flnd themselves alone .3.3 \"I::10n the decis ion to send 
troops ~_n to the Sudal;' was announced, 1 t CanlC at firs t a.s a not 
too l)lea~ant surprise to the 13ri tish public. In genera.l, the 
people regarded it as a some~lat rash move, especially since it 
came at a season of t;-le yca:t" not suited for desert warfare, and 
at a time when the British populaoe were very much interested ~ 
the economic, political, and military progress Egypt ha.d been 
makinz, proeress which a war in the Sudan would disrupt.34 
Publio reactton wa.s a factor "'Vhich the gov'crnment had to 
consider, bu.t lt was a faotor which they felt confident of con-
trolling, if their armies met with any degree of' success. The 
British cabinet was quite a.pprehensive When, almost before the 
campaign was underway, thetr invadi!'..g army, lead by Lord Kl tcr,;.-
ener, came closo to ruin due to floods a:r.;.c. dust storms. During 
this perlod nm'rspaper correspm~dents were "chained to headquart ... 
era" to ~revent the British people from hearing this disturbing 
news • .35 However, once the army began to move forward .. it took 
very little to arouse public enthusiasm. When a small skirmish 
33Churchill, River !!!:. 314. 
34Atterldge, Toward. Khartoum, 328. 
35churehill, River !!£. 148. 
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in which the Anglo-Egyptian army suffered only two casual ties waa 
presented to the people as a major victory, Englishmen cast aside 
most of their resistance to the invasion. Very soon any carping 
criticism was lost in the general approval of their government's 
course ot action. 36 
At firat, it was announoed that Lord Kitchener would proceed 
only as far as the town of Dongola, about 100 miles up the Nile 
Into the Sudan. It was only after this point had been reached 
trl&t Kitohener was told to proceed further. This procedure was 
followed, at least partially, with an eye to public approval. It 
was possible to take Dongola almost entirely with Egyptian sol-
diers and Egyptian money. Total conquest of the Sudan, on the 
other hand, would mean spending British pounds and endangering 
British troops, two considerations always unpopular with the 
British citizenry, as they are with any people. 
In view of possible public disapproval, Salisbury might not 
have sanctioned any tmmediate advance beyond Dongola if this 
gesture toward invasion had driven the French out of the Sudan. 
However, it Is important to note that the Government was respon-
sible for the invasion, and that it was planning eventually to 
continue the conquest of the Sudan until the whole country was in 
British hands. This is indicated not only by Salisbury'. long 
standing desire to control the entire Nile river valley, but also 
36 Ibid., 155. 
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by the faot that the prime minister approved the building of a 
railroad which extended 200 miles beyond Dongola, at a time when 
Dongola was the only definite term of the invasion. This rail-
road, which was to bridge a huge b,nd in the Nile river, would 
have been useless unless Britain took much more territory than 
the publioly announoed objective.37 
After Dongola had been taken and it was seen that the French 
had no intention of leaving southern Sudan, Parliament resolved 
to send their armies at least to Khartoum, the country's capital. 
fhis move, the result ot involved diplomatic dealings with the 
French. 38 was largely the work of Parliament, which also saw to 
it that public enthusiasm tor the move was fostered. As part ot 
this propaganda campaign, General Kitohener was brought baok to 
Great Britain to do battle against the anti-imperialists on the 
home front and to tire the enthusiasm of the people for the cause 
of oonquest.39 
Onoe the Egypt1an and British armies were sent on their way 
to Kha'rtoum, there was little doubt that they would continue pa3t 
the 01 ty and tal<:e over the entire country. The French, en-
trenched at Fashoda, deep in the southern end of the Sudan, had 
to be driven out. This was the conviction of British publio 
37cromer, Modern Egypt, II, 94. 
)8Balevy, Histo£l £! England, V, 3S. 
39 ~leobald, ~ Mahdlya, 208. 
i 
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opinion as well as of Parliament. So, with the solid approval ot 
his government and fellow citizens, Kitchener advanced in the 
manner already described and seoured the whole country for Great 
Britain. 
Thus it may be said that although the actions of the British 
government were clearly conditioned by the pulse of popular opin-
ion, it was Parliament, or in many cases more precisely the Bri-
tish cabinet, which was responsible for the direction of imperial 
polioy in the Sudan. 
Armed now with a knowledge of Britain's activities in the 
Sudan during the late nineteenth century and with some idea ot 
who was responsible for these activities, it is at last possible 
to attack more directly the motivation behind these activities. 
In chapters IV and V the two most important motives will be 
treated. Chapter IV will discuss the influence of economic oon-
siderations on British imperial policy in the Sudan. 
\ ' 
CHAPTER IV 
A RUN FOR THEIR MONEY 
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the 
final lap in the race of the European powers for colonies. Early 
in the race Great Britain had pulled out ahead due to a combina-
tion of central!zed, orderly government and offective industria-
lization. Moat Englishmen had no fears about the outcome of the 
contest until the 1870's. Then they saw thlt their free trade 
policy, which had looked so promia ing in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, was not working out as planned. The European powers were 
not adopting Manchesterism in ita entirety. As professor Langer 
has written, "England had e'1ulpped the other nations to be her 
competitors, and now, with the English marl{ets wide open, they 
were pouring their products into what ought to be a British pre-
serve."l On the other hand, Britain found her own exports 
unwanted by foreign nHtions. 
As the colonial race neared its climax, France, Italy, Russi 
and Ger!!lany began to make their bidS, and France and R1JSsia 
allied themselves against England in 1894. All these European 
powers fought their way to the finish line in a whirl of tarriffs 
lLanger, Diplomacy 2! Imperia11sm, 16. 
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colonial land grabbing, and investments abroad. Experienced 
muddler England, seeIng her lead threatened, battled with all her 
experience and mature strength to pull away. Spurred on by desir 
for the victor's honors and purse, Engla.nd pushed ahead and acros 
the finish line. ~e contest was the race for empire; the main 
prize, three million square miles of land in Africa; the first 
place winner, Englalld. 
'fhe manner, time, and location of this colonial race were 
determined mainly by the forces of profit and pride. Saving a 
study of the latter motive for the following chapter, we will 
here investigate the influence of the pound sterling on British 
imperialisM as illustrated by its manifestations in the Sudan. 
A series of graphs would show that t.rte 8ri tish policy in the 
Sudan of Ital ternate slaughter and. scuttlelt2 varied, at its most 
important stages, in closely paralleling proportion to the rise 
and fall of the possibilities for British economic profit. The 
Sudan was abandoned when its conquest would hav,e been costly and 
I"elatively unprofitable. It was taken when the move gave promise 
of large econom:i.c returns and low overhead cost. Self-interest 
~as the keynote of British policy in the Sudan. The decisions 
regarding this country were correctly characterized by the state-
ment made in 1883 by a member of the House of COllWlona that: "The 
2HUgh E. M. Stutfield, "'fh .• Position of Af.taira in the 
Eastern Sudan." !h.!. l'ortnightly Review, XLIX (April 1891), 386. 
S
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first object you [Mr. Gladstone] had when you went to Egypt was 
to establish English interests. It was for the gospel of self-
ishness that you .... nt. it was for the British interests. tt) 
In 1883 the British government did not want the Sudan. To 
take it would have been costly; to keep it, unprofitable. Con-
quest would have been expensive because the fanatical Mahdist 
revolutionaries would have to be defeated by British money and 
British soldiers. a policy which England avoided whenever possi-
ble. A nation which had won ita empire largely by means of trade 
companies or native troops, England was averse to spilling its 
own blood or spending its own money to gain territory. In the 
Sudan the questions was, could the country be conquered with 
Egyptian resources. In 1883 the answer was definitely in the 
negative. Egypt's national debt had grown to over 100,000,000 
pounds,4 and the Egyptian army could not even defend the parts ot 
the Sudan as yet not captured by the Mahdi.S Colonel Stewart, an 
able British officer in Egypt, reported that this country "had 
not money enough nor fighting men enOUghn6 fo~ the task. 
Conquering the Sudan would have saved the lives ot many of 
the declared enemies of the Mahdi in this territory, a group of 
3Charles Chaille-Long, "England in Egypt and the Soudan," 
~ Borth American ReVie., CLIVIII (March, 1899), 571. 
4Ha11, Empire to Commonwealth, 367. 
5Abbaa, ~ Sudan Question, 35. 
6 Morley, ~ 2! Gladstone, III, 145. 
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at least 55,000 people which included Egyptian garrisons and oi-
vilians, toreign businessmen and missionaries, Sudanese who 
opposed the revolutionaries. British military interterence could 
have established an orderly, humane government in place ot the 
Mahdist reign ot terror. However, such a policy held no promise 
of immediate economic returns tor England. As a literary publi-
oation of that time stated, "The Sudan was still looked at throug' 
financial spectacles, it did not pay its way, and was therefore 
worthles8--not worth the life of a British grenadier; it was a 
long way otf and might therefore be ignored. n7 Prime Minister 
Gladstone wrote in February, 1884, that the British government 
had no desire "to inour the very onerous duty of seouring to the 
people of the Sudan a just future government.u8 And, as it 
turned out, very little was done even to evaouate the Egyptians 
and others in the Sudan who desired safe escort out of the coun-
try. Lord Cromer himself testified that "the withdrawal was for 
the most part never eftected at all."9 
In 1896 the (.oonomio situation was quite changed. The Sudan 
could then be conquered with very little expenditllre of British 
money or men; at that date seizing the country appeared very 
CLXI 
7UEngland and Egypt in the Sudan," The QuartePll Review, 
(October, 1885), 488. ---
8 . n Knaplund, ~ladstonet8 Foteign Poliol, 238. 
9Cromer, Modern EgYpt, 11,31. 
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profitable to England. 80 it was seized. 
When Parliament decided on March '12, 1896, that the Sudan 
should be invaded, it knew Egypt could do the job without exten-
sive help. Egypt had the money and_soldiers necessary to defeat 
the Mahdista. Financially Egypt had not only eliminated her 
national debt during the years of British occupation, but she had 
acoumulated a surplus of 250,000 pounds. Egypt's battle against 
bankruptcy had been won by Lord Cromer in 1888 when financial 
equilibrium took the place of an annual deficit in that country!O 
Militarily, too, Egypt could stand on its own reet. By 1899 the 
Egyptian soldiers no longer ran away at the tirst hint of battle 
with the Mahdi. Rather they were standing up to and defeating 
Sudanese armies which greatly outnumbered them. In this year the 
Egyptian army came ot age at the battle of Toski where 2000 
Egyptian soldiers, trained and lead by British officers, deteated 
a horde of over 13,000 ~udanese. In this battle, fought along t 
Nile some 40 miles inside Egypt, the Mahdlsts lost about 10,000 
1 'CI d 1 165.11 men whl e the .Dgyptian dead and wounded amounte to on y 
By 1896 Egyptian troops were competent to handle almost any torce 
the Sudanese could send against them. 
Since Egypt could do the job, the British government decided 
that Egypt ~as the one to do it. ~ince the invasion was pre-
lOp. M. Sandwith, "Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan," The Cam-
bridge Modern Historz, XII (New York, 1910), 44S. --- ---
11 Cromer, Modern EgyPt, II, 70. I, 
'I I, 
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sauted as a move to retake for Egypt a territory which rightfully 
belonged to her, England decided tha'c 'Egypt could tt justly be 
called upon to bear the expensea."12 of the war and to supply the 
soldiers neoessary tor the operation. When Kitohener began his 
advance toward Dongola, his army consiated solely of Egyptian 
troop.. As Lord Cromer comment.: "A Br1tish battalion was sent 
from Cairo to Wadi Halfa [on the Egypt-Sudan border], more as an 
indication that in ease of need English help would be forthcoming 
than for any other reason. 80me BrItish officers were temporari-
11' lent to the Egyptian army but beyond this assistance, it was 
decided to employ only Egyptian troops in the Nile valley~13 In 
matters of finance or logistics the British War Office maintained 
the discrete silenoe ot a friendly but disintspested power. The 
war was not only fought by Egypt but it W4& directed a& far as 
possible from Egypt. In a life ot Lord Kitohener we read that 
the British home government "only spoke when spoken to and accep-
ted no responsibility. To Kitchener fell the exeoutive, but in 
Cromer was vested absolute control • • • '1'0 and through the 
Agency (in Cairo] passed all demands for men, materials, stores. 
and money. and the Agentts (l.e., Cromerta] endorsement was all 
that was reqUired to assure th~lr delivery."14 
12.!.ill.., 8S. 
13 ill.2.., 86. 
14Tb.eobald, '!'he MahdiIa, 196 [q~otatlons cited from Sir 
aeorge Arthur, Lire-of tord Kitohener, I, 190]. 
---
Eventually some British funds and fighters were needed when 
it was derinltely decided that the whole of the Sudan should be 
retaken as soon as possible. The British contributed 800,000 
pounds during the Sudan campaign to supplement ~le Egyptian ex-
penditure of 1,$54.000 pounds,15 and 8,200 British troops marched 
with the 17,600 Egypti~n soldiers in the advace toward Khartoum:6 
But as Winston Churohill has written, "English history does not 
record an instanoe of so great a. national satisfaotion being more 
cheaply obtained."17 
Satisfied indeed was the Hrltish government with the eoono-
mic returns from their investment. It'irst of all, they were able 
to add to their empire a very sizeable territory in which British 
trade and investments could bring a consolIng profit in the years 
to come. Although the Sudan did not live up completely to the 
description 1n ~lackwood's Edinburgh Magazine which stated that 
it was a land one had but to "tickle with a hoe" to make it 
"laugh with harvest,n18 yet it was by no means the "useless 
eountryH19 General Gordon had olaimed. The ~uda.n provided a fine 
15cromer, Modern Ei~Rt, 
16 R Churchill, 1ver!!!:, 
17 Ibid ... 362. 
II, 105-106. 
249. 
18 
"Tb.e Recovery of the Soud.an," Blackwood's Edinbur£,£.l MaGa-
zine, eLII (OctOber, 1892), 875. 
19GOrdon, Journals, 117. 
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outlet tor British investments, thu8 helping to supply England's 
most pressing economic need at that ttme. 20 It also beoame a 
fairly lucrative market for British manufaotures as well as a 
welcome source of the raVI materials Britain needed. It became a 
ohief source for guml arabic; it exported ivory and hides in size-
able quantities; it was to become the second largest producer of 
cotton 1n the British empire. 2l The majority of these exports 
were bought by 1i:ngla.nd who in turn supplied at least one-thlrd of 
the Sudan's imports. 
Secondly, l'Jlgland was a bie to incorporate this backward and 
debt ridden country into its empire without worrying about the 
Sudan's financial difficulties. By the ingeniously arranged dual 
oontrol of the oou..."1.try, EnglLlld was able to assume the executi va 
powers in the country while shunting all the money worries onto 
l'''!gypt. J..'urine; the first docade of condominium rule, Egypt payed 
this annual deficit in the Sudanese budget, amounting to a total 
of 2,750,000 pounds.22 By the end of that poriod the Sudan was 
solvent. 
'I'hj.rdl-;,r, possession of the Sudan supplied a long link in the 
coveted chain of British lands stretchlng from Cairo to the Cape 
of Good Hope. A Cape-to-Cairo railroad was often in the minds 
2°Langer, Diplomacy 2f. L'T1perialism, 73. 
21 Abbas, Sudan Question, 96. 
22 Moon, ImperialIsm ~ World Politics, 155. 
II, 
and on the lips of British imperialists of the late nineteenth 
century. Economically such a railroad would have been a boon to 
British trade 1n Africa. It is interesting to note that Lord 
Kltchener seems to have had the Cape.to-Cairo railway in mind 
rrom the very beginning of his invasion of the Sudan. Kitchener 
insisted, accord1ng to one of' his biographers, that the guage of 
the road bed he laid 1n the Sudan conform to tha.t used 1n South 
Africa so that the two sets of tracks might eventually be joined 
without difficulty or added expense.23 llhough this continent 
spanning ra:tlroad was still a thine of' the future, ta.kin~ the 
Sudan did have the immed.late commercia.l value of' opening "an un-
interrupted highway • • • for commerce from the Great .i.takes to 
the !ted! terranean, throu!'jhout the ~nt1re lenp-th of the valley of 
the Nlle. p24 
TI1ese reasons why the British '.vere SIl t1.s fied with the econo-
mic value of the Sudan were important, but they were far out-
weighed by another consIderatIon, which was that possession of 
the Sudan protected the British hold on Egypt, the country which 
contained t~e Suez carAl. Historians generally admit that "if 
there had been no British India, there would have been no Anglo-
Z3Theobald, The Mahdlya, 210 [the biograPher referred to is 
Sir George Arthur;-tife ot lord Kitchener, I, 207]. 
24stutfield, "Affairs in the Eastern Soudan," FortnightlY 
Review, XLIX, 392. 
-
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Egyptian question,n2$ or, in other words, that Britain probably 
would not have taken the Sudan if she were not interested in pro-
26 tecting her route to India. Obviously, such concern over a 
trade route was motivated in great part by economic considera-
tions. And it is certainly true that the financial worth of 
Britain'a eastern empire depended vitally on the Suez canal. 
A •• 11 rounded rear that Germany, Belgium, or, particularly, 
Prance might take over ~~e Sudan worred English atatesmen durIng 
the 1890·s. This was a serious matter because anyone of these 
powera could have ruined Egypt financialll merely by divertIng 
the waters of the Nile before they reached Egypt. As long aa the 
Mahdi.~. had control of the Sudan there was no danger of this for 
the Sudane.e were not much interested in international affaira 
nor were they sufficiently organized or rich enough to build the 
dams and reservoirs neoessary for .uch tactics. This fact more 
than any other explains why England allowed the Sudanese to break 
otf from Egypt in 1883 but decided to reattach it to Egypt 1n 
1896. It Prance or any other nation could bankrupt Egypt, the 
2$"Bnglish Policy in tile Soudan and Egypt," The British 
Quarterly Heview, LXXX (July, 1884), 129. 
26 Abbas, Sudan Question, 2$; Bowen, Conflict in Egypt 198; 
Paul Knaplund, ~ BrItIsh Empire: 1815-1939 tNe. YOrk, 1941), 
331 & 34$; Langer, Diplomacy of ~erlali8m, 108, William P. 
Moneypenny and George E. BUCkle,. tIre of Benihamin Disraeli 
(N •• York, 1929), 1313; Frank Riohardson Cana, fi e Anglo.Egyptian 
Sudan," Encyclopedia aritannica, XXI (Bew York, 1~29), 511; 
Samuel w. Biker, "African DeveIopment: the Sudan, The Fortnightlz 
Revi.w, XLVI (Bovember, 1889), $72. ---
lP
71 
nation controlling the Sudan might easily take over Egypt on the 
same pretext England had used, to restore peaee and prosperity to 
Egypt. 
That there were other nations interested in the Sudan for 
the above reason is easy to verity. All of the big powers were 
interested. Russia was only a remote threat; Italy was near at 
hand 1n Eretria, but she was too weak to worry about. In tact 
England had encouraged Italy to expand into Abyssinia and, tem-
porarily, into the Sudan to keep France out of those sectors.27 
In 1888 Germany had made a rather abortive attempt to take the 
Lake Victoria region and northern Sudan. In this year the German 
Karl Peters led an expedition into the Sudan ostensively to aid 
an Egyptian army which was still battling the Sudanese revolu-
tionaries. Peters tells us in his books that what Germany actu-
ally wanted Emin Pasha, the Egyptian commander, to do was to 
extend his dominion southward to Lake Victoria and German East 
Africa. "The German Emin-Pasha expedition," says Peters, "was no 
pleaaure trip, but a large.seale colonial, political expedit10n~~ 
In 1890 Belgium sent an expedition from the Congo to the 
Bile to claim terr1tory which the ~nglo-Belgian MacKinnon Treaty 
ot 1890 allowed them. This was something England had permitted 
on paper butwhich she had no wish to see materialize. 
27.00n, ImperialiSM ~ World Politics, l44. 
28 Langer, Diplomacf 2! Imperialism, 125. 
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Theretore, even betore 1896 England had had her worries 
about European interference in the Sudan, but until that date she 
had been able to handle the situation by diplomacy, treaties, 
assertions that the Sudan was her "sphere of influence." But 
then France began to take serious steps to take over southern 
Sudan. As has been seen, no sooner did Major Marchand start for 
the Nile than England launched an attack on the Sudan. As early 
as March 28, 189$, Sir Edward Grey, under-secretary for foreign 
affairs, had warned France publicly that "the whole Nile valley 
was a British sphere of influence, and that the' advance of any 
French expedition, marching under secret orders into this region 
would be an tunfriendly act.,n29 During the "River War" of 
'96-'98 "protection of Egyptian rights" was amphasized more than 
the British sphere of influence,30 but whatever the diplomatiC 
approach, the fact was that England would not allow France to 
take possession of any part of the Nile valley. One of the major 
under17ing reasons for this was the danger involved to the econ-
omy or Egypt and the subsequent danger to England's hold on the 
country. 
From what has been said, therefore, it seems evident that 
economic considerations were among the most important motives 
behind the British imperialistic policy in the Sudan, It is 
29Moon, Imperialism ~ World Polities, 148. 
)OHalevy, Hlstorz 2! ~ English 1a ~ Nineteenth Centurl, 
V, 59. 
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impossible in such matters to weigh exactly the primaoy of moti-
vatIon, but without doubt the factor of finance and the motive 
to be treated in Chapter V, national pride, were the two major 
influenoes in the history of British imperialism in the ~dan 
during the last 20 years of the nineteenth century. 
CHAPTER V 
PRIDE OF PAUfERS A~D PRIME MINISTERS 
The profit motive alone will not adequately aocount for the 
manifestations of British imperialism in the Sudan.. iinancial 
gain will not explain the enthusiasm tor imperIal conquest among 
so many nineteenth century Englishmen. Ordinary citizens do not 
lay down their lives or spend their tax money to fight purely 
eoonomic wars. Nor should the members of Parliament who favored 
imperialism be accused of acting solely from a motive of economic 
expediency. Reoourse must be had to something more stirring than 
a financial report to explain a war fought by a free people. The 
brutality of war must be ennobled by the presence. actual or 
artIfiCially injected, of honorable goala. Some le8s patently 
pragmatic philosophy must be sought which would justity the 
actions of the British in their own eyes. 
Such idealism was infused into the British territorial 
aggrandizement known as imperialism by another "i8m" called 
nationalism, which phenomenon must be understood if England's 
activitIes in the ~dan are to be explained. Nationalism haa 
been described by professor Hans KOhn as a state of mind which 
leads men to give their "supreme loyalty" to their nationality.l 
74 
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Further clarirication of the notion is given by Carlton J. H. 
Haye. who speaks of nationalism as a "proud and boasttul habit or 
mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hos 
tile attitude toward oth~r nations.~ It is, he continues, " a 
kind ot extended and exaggerated egotism • • • it is patriotiC 
snobberz.,,2 
Bat1onaliem, then, is first of all a close identification ot 
the citizen with his country. It implies the belief that what-
ever benefits the country benefits the citizen. Whatever terri-
tories the nation receives are views as personal possessions or 
achievements by the nationalist minded citizen. England's vast 
empire, for example, was referred to as "our empire" alike by 
British paupers and ministers of government. The vast areas 
colored red on the map of the world caused the breasts of the 
propertyless as well as of the wealthy to swell with pride. 
Secondly, nationalism engenders the conviotion that onet. 
own nationality is superior to all others. Here too imperialism 
found a strong bulwark in nationalism. Colonie. were viewed a. 
"manifestations ot national greatness,"3 or, as Disraell put it 
with regard to the British empire, they were a proof of the 
1 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Studz of Its Origins 
~ Background (~~51', 16. - --
20arlton J. H~ Bayes, Essazs on Nationalism (New York, 1941) 
275. --
3David Thompson, En~land !a ~ Nineteenth Century: 1815-
~ (Baltimore, 1953), oj. 
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"commanding spirit of these islands. u4 Extension of empire could 
be leen as a natural consequence of "certain qualities in our 
national character. uS 
Such a notion further implies a certain divine mandate to 
conquer and to rule others. It justifies imperialism as a task 
assigned b7 God, which opinion Kipling expresses in his poem 
Recessional when he writes. 
God of our father, known ot old, 
Lord of our rar~tlung battle-line, 
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold 6 
Dominion over palm and pine---
Tracing the cause ot imperialism back to God in this way 
also allowed easy acceptance of the idea that incorporation into 
an empire was the greate. of boons for the conquered. Thus Lord 
Curzon could declare that "the British Empire is under Providence 
the greatest instrument for good that the world haa seen,"7 and 
Kipling could describe the imperialism of his country as a self-
sacrificing mission of mercy to the underprivileged. His poem, 
~ ~hite Man's Burden, epitomized that characterization of im-
perialism, and its popularity shows the extent to which this ide. 
was accepted by the British of his da7. 
4Langer, Diplomacl 2! Imperia11sm, 70. 
SAltred Milner, England !a Esypt (London, 1892), 43S. 
6 Rudyard Kipling, Collected Verse (New York, 1914·), 219. 
7George Curzon, Problems .2! ~!!£ East (London, 1894),ii1. 
--- , 
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The wlde-sp~ead acceptance of such notions goes fa~ toward 
explaining nineteenth century impe~ialism. Money alone was not 
at stake but national p~ide as well; and these two ingredients 
were so skillfully intermingled that they became components of 
the same reality. It is not too surprising, then that Englishmen 
were not only willing to swallow such a mixture but actually 
begged tor more. 
A fUrther consideration which made imperialism even more 
popular as a means to maintain national pride and security was 
that few persons of the imperialist nation actually had to sacri-
tice life or limb to a tta1n these gratifying resul ts. In the 
taking ot the Sudan, for example, the vaat majority of the Bri-
tish people were in the stands, not on the playing field. Or, as 
~ Spectator somewhat ecstatically commented: "We may say, indee 
• • • as the Scotch laird said of tree-planting.---'They grow 
while you're sleeping.' While the public here have been sleepi~ 
the ever advancing lines have been giving us new provinces and 
adding new territories to what Mr. Kipling has toasted as---
'The last and the largest Empire, 8 
The map that 1s half unrolled.,n 
After the first victories of Kitchener's Egyptian army on 
its march toward Dongola 1n 1896, when the British publio began 
to shout from the safety of pub or club for further advanoes into 
8nour Polioy in the Upper Nile," ~ Seectator, LXXXI 
(September, 1898), 329. 
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the heart of the Sudan, a newspaper man who accompanied Kitch-
ener's army wrote, "it was strange to hear the light-hearted way 
in which stay-at-home tactitlans arranged the immediate de.truc-
tion ot the Khalifa's power. tt9 
Whether or not the English would have gone to war so enthu-
Siastically if it had entailed more danger to themselves it is 
difficult to say. The fact is that throughout the last twenty 
years of the nineteenth century the British took aotion again and 
again in the Sudan to defend, augment, or vindioate their natlon-
al pride or prestige. 
When Great Britain allowed the Sudan to break away from 
Egyptian control, they did not see that their honor was involved. 
They could at that time utter such altruistio statementa as that 
made in the British Quarterlz Revlew whioh stated, "Our only 
intereat in the Soudan is the intereat whioh we feel in liberty 
and good government all the world over. RlO 
However, the situation waa altered in November, 1883, when 
the Mahdists killed an Englishman named Hioks who was in command 
of an Egyptian army. '!bls shedding of English blood, even thougb. 
it was the blood of a man hired by a foreign power to fight a 
foreign war, was seen as an affront to English honor. Lytton 
9Atteridge, Towards Khartoum, 329. 
lO"Engllsh Polioy in the Soudan and Egypt, n !h!. British 
Suarterlz Review, LXXX (August, 1884), 134. 
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Straohey says that fta wave of warlike feeling passed over the 
countr,.."ll "The newspapers," St,raohey writes, "beoante full ot 
artioles on the Sudan, of personal desoriptions of the Mahdi, ot 
agitated letters from oolonels and clergymen demanding vengeance, 
and of serious discussions of future policy in Egypt."12 After 
Hiok's death, the Mahdist conquests began to be viewed as an 
insult to British pride. The evacuation of the Sudan became for 
many Englishmen a point of national honor. 
Bowls of rage and cries ot excitement rang out in England 
when the British oitizenry caught the soent of what they oon-
sidered a national outrage. Newspapers and people milled around 
in searoh of a _y to repair the damage. When the Pall Mall 
--
Gazette put up General Gordon as the man to vindicate their hono~ 
public opinion took up the idea with full-throated insistanoe. 
When Gordon was finally sent to the Sudan "the nation was de-
lighted. nI) Here was a man who could save their imperial pride. 
Gordon was Just the man to keep the motive or national honor 
alive. His activities at Khartoum were followed avidly by the 
British public. When it became evident that his life was in dan-
gel', the clamor for a rescue expedition was oud enough to drive 
eVen anti-imperialist ~ladstone into action. ~hurchill writes 
llLytton,Strachey, !l!! Victorians (London, 1942). 262. 
12 Ibid., 248. 
IJChurchill, River War, 40. 
, 
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that "The Government • • • was driven to the Soudan by the cries 
of shame at home. n14 The national disgrace involved if Gordon 
were killed was unthinkable. 
When the unthinkable happened" nothing short of a full scale. 
offensive against the Mabdi would satisty the wounded pride of 
the British. As one authority has put it, the British government 
"decided, contrary to all arguments of reasoned prudence, on a 
forward policy in the SUdan," because it was "swayed by the tide 
of public passion." and was t'conscious of its oWllweakness to 
stand against such a cu:-rent. ul5 The British army had failed to 
'r~_ 16 
rescue General Gordon. 4nerefore, a British force of 13,000 
must take the field to er'ase what Quoen Victoria called "the 
stain lett upon England for ••• [Gordon's] cruel, though heroic 
fateZ,,17 
Three months of fighting, heavy expenses, numerous casual-
ties, and a Russian threat of invasion in India which caused a 
stock market crash in London,18 went far toward banking the fiery 
demands for vindIcation of honor. 'l'he British called off the 
offensive in tho Sudan, but Churchill tells us that it was done 
2nd 
14rus.., 59. 
15Yneobald, ~ Mahdiya, 125. 
16 
.!e.!!., 127. 
17Strachey, ~ Victorians, 293. 
18Wi11Iam L. Langer, European Alliances ~ A1l1gn~ent., 
ed. (Bew York, 1950), 313. 
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with eyes averted"in shame and confusion from the valley of the 
Hile." He concludes his dexcription of a disgraced England with 
the words, "stopping her ears to the gibes and cat-calls of the 
Powers, she turned toward other lands and other matters.~19 
Englishmen did not forget their disgrace. Their pride had 
been severely jolted and their military ability seriously ques-
tioned in 1884 and 1885 when British armies had failed to save 
Gordon trom the Mabdists, and then failed again in their attempt 
to a venge their hero's death. In 1896, therefore, many English-
men .ere still anxious to settle this score. Although avenging 
Gordon was not a direct reason for the decision to reoonquer the 
Sudan at precisely that time, it did supply fta strong motive to 
the British soldier and wi. a source of satisfaction to the Bri-
tish public."20 A Protestant missionary in the Sudan at the time 
referred to this notion of vengeance as the "dominant idea" in 
the minds of many Englishmen.21 Certainly, "avenge Gordon" was 
the most popular battle cry of the campaign. 
Also rankling in the hearts of the British was the tact tha~ 
as Lord Cromer has written, "during a period when British influ-
ence was paramount in Egypt, certain provinces, which had before 
been open to trade, and which might have been subjected to the 
19ChurOhill, River War, 89. 
-
20AbbaB, The Sudan Question, 40. 
21Robert w. Felkin, "~he Soudan Question," ~ Contemporarz 
Revie., LXXIV (September, 1898), 482. 
. i_ _ _r ~,
influence. of civilization, had been allowed to relapse into 
barba~i.m.n22 Cromer continues, "National honor was touched." 
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In 1896 there was a third and most pressing threat to Bri-
tish prestige in the danger of France taking over the Sudan. On 
this point, Samuel W. Baker, one time governor of the Sudan, com-
mented, "It would be a shameful attitude for England to stand by 
as a spectator, and .ee a foreign Power march into those terri-
torie. which Egypt won, but which ~gland deliberately abandonel~ 
All England was determined not to let France trample on British 
honor in this way. Winston Churchill says that when Engli.hmen 
discovered that Frenchmen were actually occupying Fashoda and 
claiming much of the Sudan, fta deep and bitter anger • • • filled 
all minds." Re finds it "pleasing to remember that ••• [this] 
great crisis found England united. Thedetermihation of the 
Government was approved by the loyalty of the Opposition, sup-
ported by the calm resolve of the peoPle. n24 This general horror 
at the thought of England losing out to France in the Sudan 
prompted the Chancellor of the Exchequer to declare, "There are 
worse evils than war. n25 The Chancellor meant by this that he 
oonsidered national honor worth fighting for. In this he was 
22 Cromer, Modern EgYpt, II, 79. 
23Samuel W. Baker, "African Development: the 
Fortnightly Review, XLVI (November, 1889), 571. 
24Churohill, _R~iv_e_r_~, 318. 
25Theobald, ~ Mabdila, 205. 
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seconded by the British Parliament and people. 
Though much more could be written about the growth of natio& 
al fe.lings at all levels of English society toward the close of 
the nineteenth century, this brier account gives a suffioient 
indication of the influenoe of nationalism on British imperialism 
in the Sudan. The point of this chapter has been made if it is 
now clear that nationalism gave the British the moral Justifica-
tion and emotional conviction they needed to approve and abet 
their country's imperial policy. 
The aptness of the description of man as an ttacquisitive 
animal" is shown in the political sphere by the wars of aggressioo 
which accompany the march of men through history with the regu-
larity of footprints. 'rhea8 wars have always been motivated by 
the desire for the power and wealth that increase of territory 
brings. However, aggressors of the Christian era have found it 
n.ce~sary to clothe these less than noble instincts in more 
respectable raiment. ~he most popular disguise whioh modern 
countries have found for the age old policy of aggrandizement 
has l been nationalism. Throughout the past hundred years national 
~ 
pride has served the British as well a.s the other great Powers of 
the world a s the alchemic element whlch can magically change base 
imperial desires for power and plunder into a golden, selfless 
duty to spread the. advantages of one's own culture to backward 
countries, or into an obedient following out of a divinely in-
spired mandate to rule. 
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The investigation of the motivation behind British imperial 
activity which has been pursued in the last two chapters complete. 
this quest for answers to the questions which vex any man who 
wishes to assess imperialism intelligently. The 801e remaining 
talk is to hand down some judgement on the morality of British 
imperialism in the Sudan. This will be attempted in the conclud-
ing chapter of this study. 
, 
CHAPTER VI 
A NEED FOR INJUSTICE 
Even 60 years after Britain's invasion of the Sudan, it is 
difficult to glveJ. 'l!uch better analysis of the British activi-
ties recounted 1n preceding chapters of this study than that 
wr1tten about 1820 by Mohammed Al1, then governor of Egypt. Th1s 
Egyptian khedive or governor said, "The great fish swallow the 
small, and E~ypt 1s necessary to England •••• England must 80me 
day take Egypt as her share in the spoil of the Turkish empire. ttl 
Since Egypt did not at that time possess the Sudan, he did not 
forsee that the British would take not only Egypt but this land 
also. 
England needed the Sudan to protect her hold on the Suez. 
She needed the raw materials and markets of the Sudan; she needed 
this link for her projected chain of colonies stretching the 
length of Africa. Flor these and othe r reasons, England needed 
the Sudan. So she took it. Although one may sympathize with 
Great Britain as she fought to maintain her economic superiority 
against the powers of Europe, this sympathy should not blind the 
Ipelkin, tiThe Soudan Question, tf483. 
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historian to the patent violation of divine law involved in Bri-
tain's conquest of the Sudan. 
On some mound or mountain appropriately close to the Suez 
canal and within the boundaries of Egypt, almighty God gave to 
Moses a set of principles in which we find the starting point for 
a judgment of British imperialism in the Sudan. One of these 
principles, which has been preserved in the inspired book of 
Exodus, is known to men as the seventh commandment. It reads, 
"Thou shalt not steal. n 11118 cOlmns.ndment, which Britain violated 
in her dealings with Egypt and ~~e Sudan, is an objective condem-
nation of British imperialism. Because she wanted and needed the 
Sudan, England took it even ~~ough it belonged to someone else. 
Hidden beneath a maze of' excusing causes and eon.f'used rea-
soning lies the untenable dootrine of British imperialism which 
one writer has expressed in the formula, "laissez prendre." This 
expression of the principle followed by Great Britain in extend-
ing her empire into the Sudan was written in 1884 by a clear 
sighted Englishman. ~'urth.er developing this notion as it was 
used at that time, this writer oomments, "Nowadays accordingly 
the only question seems to be, who is the first taker, as to any 
town or country possession of which seem8 likely to prove a.dvan-
tageous. Our interests demal1d it is the cry of the present 
generatlon."2 
2H• Ganem. "Europe's Stake in the Soudan," The FortnightlY 
Review, XXXV (May, 1864), 654. 
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One just1f1cat10n advanced ror Britain's assumption or power 
10 the Sudan is that this territory was a res nullius and there-
-
rore open to the first taker. This idea is implicit in the 1899 
Agreement which asserted that Brita1n's claim to the Sudan relted 
on the right of conquest. The same premise was acted on by Bri-
tain several times in the early 1890's, as, ror example, when she 
entered 1nto agreements with Belgium and Italy by which these 
countries were allowed to occupy parts of the Sudan.3 These 
agreements implied that the Sudan, as a ~ nullius, could be 
d1vided or conquered by Great Britain in any manner she round 
convenlent. 
All arguments in tavor of the Sudan as a res nullius at this 
-
period are specious. They only exemplity the dlplomatlc reason-
ing ot the day. It Britaln upheld the position that the Sudan 
belonged to no one, she more frequently took the contradictorr 
stand that the Sudan belonged to Egypt. 'lhese conflictlng linea 
or argumentation can be unified only by the need Britain relt she 
had :for the Sudan. Convinced of this need, her diplomats and 
ministers ot state used any reasons wh1ch would help them attain 
their ultimate end. 
When France attempted to claim southern Sudan as a res 
-
nulllus, and orrered as proof of her claim the Egypt1an proclama-
tion 1ssued in 1884 "restoring the Sudan to its chiefs,,,4 the 
'Abbas, Sudan Questlon, 54; Langer, Di~lomacl ~ Imperlalia& 
108. 
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British replied that this was meant to be only a temporary sur-
render of Egyptian rights. But Britaln's most persuasive rebut. 
tal was the unanswerable one of military might. She made it 
clear that she intended to take over the entire Sudan unless 
France could buttress her appeal to international law with the 
more convincing argument of force.S In the end it was superior 
military strength that settled the fat of the Sudan in favor or 
Great Britain. 
It seems evident that in 1896 the Sudan was an independent 
country. The Mahdlst revolt from Egypt 1n 1883 had certainly 
been justlfied. Egypt, who oould not even rule herself, bad 
given the Sudan a government which was economically burdensome 
and patently not interested in Sudanese rights or needs. Al-
though it is true that the absolute dictatorship whiCh supplanted 
the Egyptian rule was, in its tyrannical infancy, no improvement, 
by the time of the British conquest of the Sudan the Sudanese had 
less cause to complain about their government than they had had 
for centuries. Abdullah, who had become the real ruler of the 
Sudan, had for several years conducted himself in a manner which 
augured well for the future of independent Sudan. 
Due to the efforts of this Budanese Khalifa, the development 
of agriculture had advanced considerably. In sharp contrast to 
4Theobald, ~ Mahdl1a, 244. 
SCromer, Modern ESZ2t, II, 118, Theobald, ~ Mahdila. 246. 
the tamines of the first years of Sudanese independence, the 
1890's found this country plentifully supplied with grain, and 
6 it. people well fed. 
With regard to law and order, Father Ohrwalder, a missioner 
who was held captive in the ~udan for ten years, commended the 
Khalifa's reorganization of the Mahdi'a chaotic ayatem of jus-
tice.7 It appears that in the suppression of crime Abhullah'. 
government ordinarily acted honestly and with the good of the 
people at heart. 
In the matter of taxation it is true that on occasion the 
Khalifa made large and sudden demands on his people. It is safe 
to sa, that when these special levies were added to the regular 
tax •• , the people were often more heavily burdened financially 
than they had been under Egyptian rule. However, the less.nlng 
of the ordinary taxes, added to the fact that now their money at 
least remained in the country, made the Sudanese prefer the 
government of the Khalifa to that of £gypt. 8 
Even more important is the consideration that even those 
Sudaneae who were working for the overthrow of the Khalifa did 
not want to hand their country over either to Egypt, their long 
standing enemy, or to non-Mohammedan Great Britain. '~eir 
6 Theobald, ~ Mahdiya, 183. 
1Reverend Ohrwalder, fen Years Captivity !a ~ Mahdi'. f!m2, 
(London, 1892), 214. ---
8 
Theobald, !ht Mahdila, 182. 
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national independence, which Egypt had recognized in the procla-
mation of 1884, as well as on a later occasion when the Egyptian 
High Commissioner WfiB sent to the Mahdi to determine the boundaI7 
lines between the two coun~ries,9 was something the Sudanese 
heartily wished to preserve. 
Because England would benefit economically by control of the 
SUdrul, and because the Sudanese government dould easily be over-
thrown, the British refused to consider the possibility of the 
Sudan's right to its own government. Little or no consideration 
was given to the subject of possible injustice to the Sudanese 
inherent in the British conquest. On the other hand some lip 
service was paid to the Egyptian claims to this country. Britain 
sought to placate the ~gY'ptian government as far as s:ae could, 
consistent with her determination to maintain the real control ot 
the country llerself. The 1896-1899 campaign, fought for the most 
part with Egyptian money and men, was put forth as a venture 
a.imed at returning t:;he Sudan to Egypt. It was, therefore, 
necessary to give Egypt some part at least in the government of 
the Sudan. To achieve this end the dondominium form of govern-
ment was decided on by Great Britain. Lord Cromer explains that 
this British invention made the Sudan "Egyptian to suc.h an extent 
as to satiJfy equitable and political exigencies. H10 
9lbbaa, ~ Sudan Question, 72. 
lOCromer, Modern ESypt, II, 115. 
1 
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However, the Egyptians were not pleased either with the 
condominium or even with the conquest of the Sudan itself. The 
Khedive and t.he Egyptian nationalists opposed the British insti-
II gated invasion of the Sudan from start to finish. \Vhen the 
British informed the Khedive of their decision to retake the 
Sudan, he se.w the action as one meant to further Brltlsh rather 
than Egyptian interests. Certainly it was not instigated "at 
the request of Egyptn12 as Britain claimed. Religiously, the 
Moslem Ef,yptlar~ did not approve of their own army, officered and 
supplemented a~ it was by Christians. 1) Economically, they felt 
their country needed further financial stability and such im-
provements as dams and reservoirs much more than it needed the 
Sudan at that tlme. 14 
Egyptian opposition to the decision to reconquer the Sudan 
was slif)lt in comparison to their chagrin and helpless anger at 
the form of government Great Britain forced them to accept for 
the Sudan. Botrus Ghall Pasha, the Ep,yptlan foreign minister who 
signed the 1899 Agreement, was assassinated. The Agreement 
Itselr was seen as a diplomatic trick by which Britain got the 
11Abbas, Sudan guest1on, 72. 
12Moon, Imperialism ~ World Politics, 150. 
llAbbas, Sudan Buesti2a, 57. 
l4churchi11, Riv6r War, 100. 
-
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Sudan and Egypt got the bills. 15 'Ji~'ith some justification the 
Egypt1ans felt that they might not have been accepted as co-ruler 
of the Sudan if that country had not been a financial liability. 
Actually, Egypt had little part in the goverr~ent of the Sudan. 
The highest offices held by Egypt1ans in the Sudanese condomin1um 
government were those of mamurs, in reality a8sista~t8 to assis-
tant district commissioners.16 
It must ue admitted that British control of the Sudan did in 
many ways benefit both Egypt and the Sudan. Egypt had no longer 
to worry that a foreign power might interfere with the waters ot 
the Nile. Also she was spared the difficulties of ruling the 
Sudan at a time when she required Bl"itish assis tance to govern 
even her own territory. As for the Sudan, 'the British provided 
the country with the best government it had ever known. As one 
modern scholar has written: "The Sudan has been very fortunate 
in attracting high quality British imperial admi.nistrators of a 
kind which inspired the epigrllm of tha late H. A. L. Fisher: 'The 
Sudan. gentlemen, Is a large oountry populated by blaoks and 
governed by blues. ,tt17 The slave trade was abolished; agriculture 
was encouraged on a grand scale; taxes were appreciably lowered; 
the natives were to some ex~ent educated and prepared for even-
15Abbas, Sudan Suestlon, 52. 
16 ~., 51. 
17Andrew Roth, "Dl1e:nm;e. in the Sudan." 'I'heNatlon, CLXXIV 
(May 24, 1952), 499. ---
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tual selt-government. 
Nevertheless, unless the prinoiple is admitted that the end 
justities the means, this episode of British imperialism must 
stand condemned. Either the Sudan was an independent country or 
it belonged to Egypt. In either ease, the British conquest was 
an act ot aggression flowing out of a series of similar acts by 
which Great Britain had unjustly maintained control of Egypt 
itself. It was an injustice which England thought necessary to 
maintain her position a8 a world power; it was an injustice ap-
proved by British nationalisM; it was an injustice which brought 
definite benefits to both Egypt and the Sudan. But it was an 
injustice. 
, 
l 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
Gordon, Charles George. The Journals of Major-General Charles 
G. Gordon at Khartoum:- Edited with notes and an introduo-
tion by Alfred Egmont Hake. Boston, 1885. 
Kipling, Rudyard. Collected Verse. Ne. York. 1914. 
Ro.eberr, Arohibald Philip Primrose, F1fth Earl of. Miscellaniea: 
L1terary !e! H1storical. 2 yola. London, 1921. 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES 
A. BOOKS 
Abbas, Mekki. The Sudan Question: The Dispute over the Anglo-
ESlptian Condominium, la84-19~ London, ~.---
Allen, Bernard. Gordon .!!'ll! ~ .-S_u_d..,an_. London, 1931. 
Atteridge, A. Hilliard. Towards Khartoum: The Story of the 
Soudan !!£ 2.! 1896. London, 1897. - - -
Bowen, John. !h.!. Confliot 2!. ~ !WS !!m .!!l ESIPt. New York, 
1881. 
Churohill, W1nston. 
!?! l!l!. Souda.n. 
The River War: An Account of the Reconquest 
New York, I933.- --
Cromer, Evelyn Baring, Lord of. Modern Egypt. 2 vols. Ne. 
York, 1916. 
Ensor, R. C. K. England: 1810-1914. London, 1946. 
Halevy, Elie. 
Century. 
A History of the En~118h People .!!l !e.! NIneteenth 5 vols. London; 19 1. 
94 
 • and the Suda ............. .;;;.;;00;. __
lPt •
i t
li
Hall, Walter. Em\lre to Commonwealth: Thirtl Years 2! BrItish 
!!ieria1 aIs ory.--New York, !~28. 
95 
Knaplund, Paul. Gladstone'. Foreign PO*i01. Ne. York, 1935. 
Langer, WIlliam L. Huopean Alliances ~ Alligpments: 1871-1890. 
Bew York, 1950. 
-----. ~ Diplomacl £! ImperialIsm: 1890-1902. N •• York, 1951. 
Low, Sydney, and Sandera, LIord. 'lb.e liistorl .21: ~land durIng ~ reign 2! Victorial 1837-19QI. London, 19. 
MarrIott, SIr J. A. R. England Since Waterloo. London, 1925. 
-----. Modern England: 1885-1945. London, 1948. 
Moneypenny, William, and Buckle, George. !h!.!4!.!.2! BenJamin 
Disraeli. 2 vola. New York, 1929. 
Moon, Puker. ImperIalism ~ World Politics. New York, 1927. 
Morley, John. ~e Life of William Ewart Gladstone. 3 vols. 
New York, m2:-- -
Ohrwa1der, Reverend. !!a Years Captivitz ~ ~ Mahdi's CamR. 
London, 1892. 
Sandwith, F. M. "Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan," The Cambridge 
Modern History. XII. Ne. York, 1910. 
81atln, Bey. FIre and Sword in the Soudan. 
-- ----== 
London, 1896. 
Somervell, D. C. English Thought 1a ~ Nineteenth Centu£z. 
New York, 1927. 
Strachy, Lytton. ~ VIetoriana. London, 1942. 
Theobald, A. B. The Mahdila: ! Historz 2! ~ Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan: 1881-~2. London, 1951. 
Thompson, David. ~land 1a l£! Nineteenth Centurl: 1815-1914. 
Baltimore, 19 3. 
\Vhi te, Arthur S. The Expans ion !?!. Bupt under ~ Anglo-Egyptiy 
Condominium. ~ndon, 1899. 
Young, George.M. Victorian England: Portrait 2! ~ Age. New 
York, 1954. 
_ ......... == 
• 
l 
B. ARTICLES 
Baker, Sir Samuel W. "African Development: the Souda~," The 
Fortnigptly Review, XLVI (September, 1889), 134-~2. ---
.----. "The Soudan and its ~uture," LIttell's Living Age, CLX 
(February, 1884), 289-299. 
B1untL WilfrId Scawn. "The Truth of the Dongola Adventure, ft ~ Nineteenth Centurz, XXXIX (May, 1896), 739-745. 
Chaille-Long, Charles. "England in Egypt and the Soudan," The 
Horth American ReView, CLXVIII (January, 1899), 170-180:-
De Casson, E. A.. "The Future of the Soudan," The Fortnightly 
aeview, XXXVI (November, 1884), 516-527. ---
Edwards, Frederick Augustus. "Reoonquering the Sudan," The 
aent1emantt Magazine, LIX (September, 1897), 360-J7r;-
"England and Egypt in the Sudan," !h!. gtlarterly ReView, CLXI 
(October, 1885), 470-$03. 
"English Policy in the Soudan and Egypt," ~ British Quarter11 
Review, LXXX (July, 1884), 129-147. 
"The Fate of the Soudan," ~ Edinburgh Review, OLXXV (February, 
1892), 232-273. 
Felkin, Robert W. "The Soudan Question," The Contemporary Review. 
LXXIV (October, 1898), 482-496. ---
Ganem, H. "European Stakes in the Soudan," The Fortnightly Re-
.!!!!" XXXV (June, 1884), 645-654. - -
"General Gordon in the Sudan," The Nation, XXXVIII (February 14, 
1884), 145. ---
Griffiths, Arthur. "The Conquest of the Soudan," ~ Fortnishtll 
Review, LX (December, 1896), 680-692. 
Hoogstraa1, Harry_ "South in ~le Sudan," The Natioaal Geographic 
Magazine, OIII (February, 1953), 249-~. 
"How the Sudan Got into English Politics," The Nation, XXXVIII, 
(February 28, 1884), 183-184. ---
, 
l
l )
)
rterll
,
0111
Hurewltz, J. c. ttBritaln, Ep'ypt, and the Sudan: I," Foreign 
Po11cl Bulletln~ XXXII (March 15, 1953), 231-234. 
97 
"Our Policy on the Upper lUls, rt ~ Spectator, LXXXI (September, 
1898), 328-329. 
"Reconquest of the Sudan, If 'rne Athenaeum, II (September, 1898), 
311-312. 
"The Recovery of the Soudan," ~lackwood', Edinburgh l~gazine, 
eLII (December, 1892), 875-891. 
Simpich. Frederick. "Along the 111e, through Egypt and the Sudan: 
The National Geosraphic Magazine, XLII (Ootober, 1922), 379-
4IO. 
Stutfield, Hugh E. A. "The Future of the Soudan," The Fortnight-
II Review, XXXVI (November, 1884), 516-527. ---
"'!'he Sudan Advance: What Next?," ~laokwood's BClnburgh Magazine, 
CLIX (August, 1896). 297-307. 
"The Sudan under British Influenoe," ~ Nation, LXX (Maroh, 
1900), ,321. 
Ward, John. "The Wonders of the Sudan," ~ Monthly ReView, XI 
(April, 190,3), 89-99. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Clyde B. Kelly, S. J., 
has been read and approved by three members of the Department of 
History. 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact 
that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the 
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, 
form, and mechanical accuracy. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
